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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the government had the power to compel in-
dividuals to reveal a vast amount of personal information about
themselves-where they live, their phone numbers, their
physical description, their photograph, their age, their medical
problems, all of their legal transgressions throughout their life-
times whether serious crimes or minor infractions, the names
of their parents, children, and spouses, their political party af-
filiations, where they work and what they do, the property that
they own and its value, and sometimes even their psychothera-
pists' notes, doctors' records, and financial information.
Then imagine that the government routinely poured this
information into the public domain-by posting it on the Inter-
net where it could be accessed from all over the world, by giving
it away to any individual or company that asked for it, or even
by providing entire databases of personal information upon re-
quest. In an increasingly "wired" society, with technology such
as sophisticated computers to store, transfer, search, and sort
through all this information, imagine the way that the informa-
tion could be combined or used to obtain even more personal in-
formation.
Imagine the ease with which this information could fall
into the hands of crafty criminals, identity thieves, stalkers,
and others who could use the information to threaten or in-
timidate individuals. Imagine also that this information would
be available to those who make important decisions about an
individual's life and career-such as whether the individual
will get a loan or a job. Also imagine that in many cases, the
individual might not be able to explain any concerns raised by
this information or even know that such information was used
in making these decisions.
Imagine as well that this information would be traded
among hundreds of private-sector companies that would com-
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bine it with a host of other information such as one's hobbies,
purchases, magazines, organizations, credit history, and so on.
This expanded profile would then be sold back to the govern-
ment in order to investigate and monitor individuals more effi-
ciently.
Stop imagining. What I described is what is currently be-ginning to occur throughout the United States by the use of
federal, state, and local public records, and the threat posed to
privacy by public records is rapidly becoming worse.
For decades, federal, state, and local governments have
been keeping records about their citizens. States maintain re-
cords spanning an individual's life from birth to death, includ-
ing records of births, marriages, divorces, professional licenses,
voting information, worker's compensation, personnel files (for
public employees), property ownership, arrests, victims of
crime, criminal and civil court proceedings, and scores of other
information. Federal agencies maintain records pertaining to
immigration, bankruptcy, social security, military personnel,
and so on. These records contain personal information includ-
ing a person's physical description (age, photograph, height,
weight, eye color); race, nationality, and gender; family life
(children, marital history, divorces, and even intimate details
about one's marital relationship); residence, location, and con-
tact information (address, telephone number, value and type of
property owned, description of one's home); political activity
(political party affiliation, contributions to political groups,
frequency of voting); financial condition (bankruptcies, finan-
cial information, salary, debts); employment (place of employ-
ment, job position, salary, sick leave); criminal history (arrests,
convictions, traffic citations); health and medical condition
(doctors' reports, psychiatrists' notes, drug prescriptions, dis-
eases and other disorders); and identifying information
(mother's maiden name, Social Security number). This list is
far from complete. Many of these records are open for public
inspection.
Until recently, public records were difficult to access. For a
long time, public records were only available locally. Finding
information about a person often involved a treasure hunt
around the country to a series of local offices to dig up records.
But with the Internet revolution, public records can be easily
obtained and searched from anywhere. Once scattered about
the country, now public records are consolidated by private sec-
tor entities into gigantic databases. Recently, the federal court
20021 1139
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system has proposed to make court records available electroni-
cally, sparking a considerable debate over privacy because
highly sensitive information such as one's Social Security num-
ber, medical and psychological records, financial information,
and even details about one's marital relationship are some-
times lodged in court records.
A complicated web of state and federal regulation governs
the accessibility of these records. This regulation was formu-
lated to balance two important, yet sometimes conflicting, in-
terests. One of these interests is transparency, the need to ex-
pose government bureaucracy to public scrutiny. The Federal
Freedom of Information Act is an attempt to promote such
transparency. Access to court records, in the words of Justice
Holmes, ensures "that those who administer justice should al-
ways act under the sense of public responsibility, and that
every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes
as to the mode in which a public duty is performed."1
The other interest is privacy. Increasingly, as more per-
sonal information is collected, stored, and consolidated in gov-
ernment databases, the threat to privacy is imminent. Federal,
state, and local governments have been one of the principal
suppliers of personal information to the private sector. A grow-
ing number of large corporations are assembling dossiers on
practically every individual by combining information in public
records with information collected in the private sector such as
one's purchases, spending habits, magazine subscriptions, web
surfing activity, and credit history. Increasingly, these dossiers
of fortified public record information are sold back to govern-
ment agencies for use in investigating people.
In this Article, I argue that the regulation of public records
in the United States must be rethought in light of the new
technologies in the Information Age, and I advance a theory
about how to reconcile the tension between transparency and
privacy.
First, I contend that information privacy must be reconcep-
tualized in the context of public records to abandon the long-
standing notion that there is no claim to privacy when informa-
tion appears in a public record. This view, which I term the
"secrecy paradigm," understands privacy as depending upon
whether information is secret or non-secret. The secrecy para-
digm fails to account for the realities of the Information Age,
1. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
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where information is rarely completely confidential. I suggest
that privacy must be understood as an expectation of a limit on
the degree of accessibility of information.
Second, I critique the widespread view that one has a pri-
vacy interest only in information that is embarrassing or harm-
ful to one's reputation. Much of the personal information con-
tained in public records (i.e., one's race, marital status, party
affiliation, property values, and so on) is relatively innocuous.
However, as I explain, it is the totality of the information, ag-
gregated together, that presents the problem. Consolidating
various bits of information, each in itself relatively unrevealing,
can, in the aggregate, begin to paint a portrait of a person's life.
I refer to this as a "digital biography." A growing number of
private sector organizations are using public records to con-
struct digital biographies on millions of individuals. I argue
that we should be concerned about the ways in which our digi-
tal biographies are being used. These uses are resulting in a
growing dehumanization, powerlessness, and vulnerability for
individuals. Therefore, viewed in light of my theory of informa-
tion privacy, the regulation of public record regimes must be
substantially rethought.
I contend that the appropriate balance between transpar-
ency and privacy can be reached by limiting access and uses of
certain information rather then making public records unavail-
able to the public. If the secrecy paradigm is abandoned and
privacy is understood as an expectation in the limitation of the
degree of accessibility of information, then commercial access
and use restrictions as well as a federal baseline of regulation
for all public records would help significantly in addressing the
problem.
A potential hurdle to the adoption of these solutions is the
First Amendment. Although the First Amendment establishes
a right to access certain court proceedings and records, I con-
tend that this right does not and should not extend to other
types of public records. In fact, based upon developing strands
of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Constitution imposes cer-
tain limitations and responsibilities on the government's collec-
tion and use of personal information.
Next, I analyze the implications of such a solution for the
First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and the
press. This issue is quite complicated, as there is a significant
tension between two lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
One line of cases holds that when the government makes in-
20021 1141
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formation publicly available in a public record, the press cannot
be sanctioned for publishing it. 2 Another line of cases, how-
ever, establishes that the government may selectively grant ac-
cess to public record information and suggests that the gov-
ernment may condition the receipt of such information on
nondisclosure. 3 In an extensive navigation of these potentially
conflicting precedents, I conclude that access and use restric-
tions of public record information will generally not run afoul of
the First Amendment.
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to the history
of public records and how these records are regulated. Part II
describes how privacy in this context should be reconceptual-
ized, taking into account the problems of access and aggrega-
tion. Part III examines the constitutional issues.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC RECORDS
From the beginning of the twentieth century, we have wit-
nessed a vast proliferation in the number of government re-
cords kept about individuals as well as a significant increase in
public access to these records. These trends together have cre-
ated a problematic state of affairs-a system where the gov-
ernment extracts personal information from the populace and
places it in the public domain, where it is hoarded by private
sector corporations that assemble dossiers on almost every
American citizen. In this Part, I will explore public record sys-
tems, examining the types of public records maintained by gov-
ernments and the regulatory regime that governs access to
these records. This regulatory regime has not adequately ma-
tured to respond to the realities of modern information flow.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC RECORD-KEEPING
1. Federal, State, and Local Public Records
Public record-keeping is largely a product of the twentieth
century. Before the mid-nineteenth century, few public records
were collected, and most of them were kept at a very local
2. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn Publ'g Co., 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.,
528 U.S. 32 (1999); cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (finding that pro-
hibiting abortion counseling or referral as a condition for receipt of Title X
funds does not violate the First Amendment).
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level. 4 During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century, state and local governments increasingly began to
keep records of their citizens. 5 In the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, the
expansion of the bureaucratic network of regulation, licensing,
and entitlements at the federal, state, and local levels resulted
in a massive escalation of public records.6
Today, a welter of public records is kept by federal, state,
and local governmental entities. States maintain a smorgas-
bord of public records, covering one's life from birth to death.7
Birth records can contain one's name, date of birth, place of
birth, full names and ages of one's parents, and mother's
maiden name.8 In particular, a person's mother's maiden name
is an important piece of information because many financial in-
stitutions and other entities use it as a password to access more
sensitive data. Shortly after birth, the federal government
stamps an individual with a Social Security number, which will
be used throughout her life to identify her and consolidate re-
cords about her.9 States also maintain other records relating to
one's personal life, such as records about one's marriage, di-
vorce, and death. These records are often referred to collec-
tively as "vital records." Records of marriages, which are public
in most states,10 contain maiden name, the date and place of
birth of both spouses, as well as their residential addresses."
Beyond vital records, states keep records for almost every
occasion an individual comes into contact with the state bu-
reaucracy. When a person obtains a license to drive, the state
records and publicizes information such as her name, address,
phone number, Social Security number, medical information,
4. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND
CuRIosITY FROM PLYiMOUTH RoCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000).
5. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1892, 1906-07 (1981).
6. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY
LIFE 73 (Tim May ed., 2001); ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER,
DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY
220-23 (1972). For a discussion of the expansion of government entitlements
and licensing, see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-
37 (1964).
7. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2001).
8. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425(a)(1)-(11) (West
Supp. 2002).
9. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1402.
10. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103150 (West 1996).
11. See, e.g., id. § 103175 (West Supp. 2002).
20021 1143
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1137
height, weight, gender, eye color, photograph, and date of
birth.' 2 Additionally, accident reports and traffic citation re-
cords are made publicly available by many states.
Individuals who register to vote must surrender informa-
tion into a public record. Voting records can reveal one's politi-
cal party affiliation, date of birth, place of birth, e-mail address,
home address, telephone number, 13 and sometimes one's Social
Security number. 14 In many states, this information is publicly
available.1i
One's profession and employment often generate a number
of records. A number of professions require state licensing,
such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, insurance agents, nurses,
police, accountants, and teachers. 16 If an individual is injured
at work, worker's compensation records may disclose one's date
of birth, type of injury, and Social Security number. 17 If a per-
son is a public employee, many personal details are released to
the public by way of personnel records, including one's home
address, phone number, Social Security number, salary, sick
leave, and sometimes even e-mail messages. 18 In Massachu-
12. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL FRAUD 6 n.5 (March 1997), available at
http'J/www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/privacy.pd see also
Joan Biskupic, High Court to Hear Driver Privacy Case, WASH. POST, May 18,
1999, at A8.
13. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2102, 2150(a)(1)-(10) (West Supp. 2002);
CAROLE A. LANE, NAKED IN CYBERSPACE: HOW TO FIND PERSONAL
INFORMATION ONLINE 274 (1997).
14. EDMUND J. PANKAU, CHECK IT OUT! 16 (1998).
15. Some states are beginning to restrict access to voter records for cer-
tain purposes, although the permissible purposes remain quite broad. In Cali-
fornia, for example, voter records are openly available to any political candi-
date, to any committee for or against any initiative or referendum, and "to any
person for election, scholarly, journalistic, or political purposes." CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 2194 (West Supp. 2002). Therefore, any person or entity with even a
tangential relationship to the political process can obtain this information.
16. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1403.
17. See LANE, supra note 13, at 275. Seven states make workers' compen-
sation records publicly accessible. See PUBLIC RECORDS ONLINE: THE
NATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVATE & GOVERNMENT ONLINE SOURCES OF PUBLIC
RECORDS 21 (Michael L. Sankey et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001).
18. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4(b)(8)(A)-(C) (Michie 2001) (first
version) (requiring disclosure of particular information in public employees'
personnel records including salary, education, prior work experience, and any
disciplinary troubles); Braun v. City of Taft, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654, 660-61 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984) (permitting disclosure of an employee's Social Security number,
home address, and birth date); Eskaton Monterey Hosp. v. Myers, 184 Cal.
1144
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setts, government officials are required by law to maintain
"street lists" containing the names, addresses, dates of birth,
veteran statuses, nationalities, and occupations of all resi-
dents. 19 These lists, which organize residents by the streets
they live on, are made available to the police,20 to all political
committees and candidates, and to businesses and other or-
ganizations. 21
One's home and property are also a matter of public record.
Property tax assessment records contain a detailed description
of one's home, including number of bedrooms and bathrooms,
amenities such as swimming pools, the size of the house, and
the value.22 These records are public.23 Other property owner-
ship records unveil lifestyle information such as whether one
owns a boat, and if so, its size and type.2 4
Often, any contact with law enforcement officials will yield
a record. Arrest records can contain one's name, occupation,
physical description, date of birth, and the asserted factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the arrest.25 Police records also con-
tain information about victims of crime.
Court records are potentially the most revealing records
about individuals. Whenever a person comes into contact with
the judicial system, information is released into a public record.
In almost all states, court records are presumed to be public. 26
Rptr. 840, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (permitting disclosure of a state employee's
personnel file, which contained education and training experience); Moak v.
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 336 A.2d 920, 921, 924 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (per-
mitting disclosure of payroll records that contained employees' names, gender,
date of birth, annual salary, and other personal data). But see IDAHO CODE §
9-340C(1) (Michie Supp. 2001) (exempting personnel records from public dis-
closure).
19. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001)
20. Id.
21. Id. § 6; see also Pottle v. Sch Comm. of Braintree, 482 N.E.2d 813, 817
(Mass. 1985).
22. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408.3 (West 1998).
23. See id. § 408.3(a) ("Property characteristics information maintained
by the assessor is a public record and shall be open to public inspection.").
24. See LANE, supra note 13, at 274-75.
25. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17; see, e.g., CAL. R. 243.1(c)
('Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be
open."). Not all court records are public; in most states, adoption records,
grand jury records, and juvenile criminal court records are not public. See, e.g.,
David S. Jackson, Privacy and Ohio's Public Records Act, 26 CAP. U. L. REV.
107, 120 (1997); see also The Federal Judiciary, Frequently Asked Questions,
Filing a Case, Q: How Can I Check on the Status of My Case? Can I Review
20021 1145
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Although current practice and existing physical constraints
limit the extent to which personal information in court docu-
ments can be accessed, new technologies are on the verge of
changing this reality.27
In civil cases, such as suits for personal injury, medical
malpractice, product liability, and so on, court files may contain
vast quantities of data, such as medical history, mental health
data, tax returns, and other financial information.28 For exam-
ple, in an ordinary civil lawsuit over an automobile accident,
the plaintiff must submit medical information, including any
pre-existing conditions that might affect her recovery or be re-
sponsible for her symptoms. This data could even include psy-
chological information. To establish damages, the plaintiff
must also reveal details about her lifestyle, activities, and em-
ployment. If this information is contained in a document filed
with the court or is mentioned in a hearing or at trial, it can po-
tentially become accessible to the public unless protected by a
protective order. In addition to plaintiffs, civil defendants must
also yield personal information in many instances.
Witnesses and other third parties who are involved in
cases can have deeply personal details snared by discovery and
later exposed in court documents. If a person serves as a juror,
her name, address, spouse's name, occupation, place of em-
ployment, and answers to voir dire questions may become part
of the court record. 29 Additionally, some courts have held that
the public may have access to questionnaires given to jurors as
part of voir dire.30 Voir dire questions can involve sensitive
matters such as whether a juror was the victim of a crime, the
Case Files?, at http'/www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited June 29, 2002).
Beyond pleadings and motions (which are, for the most part, always contained
in the court file), other documents (such as exhibits) and transcripts may or
may not be contained in the file. For example, typically a trial transcript will
only be contained in the court file if an appeal is taken. The availability of
other documents, such as exhibits, in the court file is controlled by local prac-
tice. Local practices vary greatly depending on limited storage capacities in
clerks' offices. Often, exhibits are kept by the parties.
27. See infra Part IA.3.
28. LANE, supra note 13, at 246.
29. See, e.g., Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court,
183 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1358-
59 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that a public right of access to voir dire proceedings
exists); People v. Mitchell, 592 N.W.2d 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
the press has a "qualified right of access" to jurors' names and addresses).
30. Lesher Communications, Inc. v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. Rptr. 154,
156-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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juror's political and religious beliefs, any medical and psycho-
logical conditions that might affect the juror's performance, and
other private details.31
Beyond ordinary civil lawsuits, special civil proceedings
such as appeals from the denial of social security benefits re-
lease much information into court records, such as a person's
disability, work performance, Social Security number, birth
date, address, phone number, and medical records.32 In federal
bankruptcy courts, any "paper filed... and the dockets of a
bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination
by an entity at reasonable times without charge."33 Informa-
tion involved in bankruptcy proceedings includes one's Social
Security number, account numbers, employment data, sources
of income, expenses, debts owed, and other financial informa-
tion. 34 Additionally, in certain circumstances, employees of a
company that declares bankruptcy can have their personal in-
formation divulged in public bankruptcy records.35
In some states, family court proceedings are public. For
example, a divorce proceeding can unmask the intimacies of
marital relationships. As one state court held, "[a] private citi-
zen seeking a divorce in this State must unavoidably do so in a
public forum, and consequently many private family and mari-
tal matters become public."36
For criminal cases, there is even less privacy. Beyond the
personal details about a defendant released at trial or in the
31. In practice, juror information is rarely sought out except in high pro-
file cases.
32. A person may appeal from the denial of social security benefits pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Dec. 21,
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-90, 115 Stat. 878. If social security information is dis-
closed in court filings, confidentiality is lost. 20 C.F.R. § 401.180 (2001).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2000).
34. Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 1011, 1020 (2000).
35. See Jerry Markon, Curbs Debated As Court Records Go Public on Net,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at B1. Normally, bankruptcy filings only include
personal information about a company's top officials. However, an Internet
furniture retailer included information in its bankruptcy petition about all
employees "to blunt criticism from creditors that it had recklessly burned
through cash." Id. At the request of creditors, a court-appointed trustee
posted the information on the retailer's website. Id.
36. In re Keene Sentinel, 612 A.2d 911, 915-16 (N.H. 1992); see also Bar-
ron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 119 (Fla. 1988)
("[Plarties seeking a dissolution of their marriage are not entitled to a private
court proceeding just because they are required to utilize the judicial sys-
tem.").
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government's indictment or charging papers, conviction records
are made public.37 Information about victims-their lifestyles,
medical data, and occupation-can also be found in court re-
cords. Presentence reports prepared by probation officers about
convicted defendants facing sentence are used by judges in ar-
riving at the appropriate sentence. These reports contain iden-
tifying information about the defendant, a summary of the
defendant's prior criminal conduct, social history, character,
family environment, education, employment and income, and
medical and psychological information. 38 Although in many
states and in federal court, presentence reports remain confi-
dential, in some states, such as California, the presentence re-
port becomes part of the court file after sentencing.39
Community notification laws for sex offenders, often re-
ferred to as "Megan's Laws," require the maintenance of data-
bases of information about prior sex offenders and disclosure of
their identities and where they live.40 In 1996, Congress passed
a federal Megan's Law restricting states from receiving federal
anti-crime funds unless they agree to "release relevant infor-
mation that is necessary to protect the public" from released
sex offenders.4' As a result, all fifty states enacted some ver-
sion of Megan's Law.42 Sex offender records often contain the
sex offender's Social Security number, photograph, address,
prior convictions, and places of employment.43 Some states
have placed their sex offender records on the Internet."4 Sev-
37. See LANE, supra note 13, at 213.
38. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10 (West 1982); CAL. CT. R.
4.411.5(a)(6).
39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203d (West Supp. 2002) ("The report
shall be filed with the clerk of the court as a record in the case at the time the
court considers the report.").
40. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
New Jersey's Megan's Law does not violate the constitutional right to informa-
tion privacy because of compelling governmental interest in preventing sex
offenses); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that Washington's Megan's Law does not violate the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy because the information compiled and disclosed is already
public).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Oct.
28, 2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 14071 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
42. Jane A. Small, Who Are the People In Your Neighborhood? Due Proc-
ess, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1451, 1459 (1999).
43. See, e.g. Paul P., 170 F.3d at 398; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082.
44. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, Sexual Offenders/Predators
Search System, at http'//www.fdle.state.fl.us/SexualPredators (last visited
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eral states fail to identify the particular crime the offenders are
charged with, lumping all of them under the label sex offender,
even where some might be rapists while others could be listed
for sodomy, public masturbation, or indecent exposure. 45
In a move broader than Megan's Law, some localities are
widely disseminating records about individuals arrested, but
not yet convicted, of certain crimes. For example, in 1997 Kan-
sas City initiated "John TV," broadcasting on a government-
owned television station the names, photographs, addresses,
and ages of people who had merely been arrested (not con-
victed) for soliciting prostitutes. 46 Other cities have initiated
similar programs.47 Additionally, a growing number of states
are furnishing online databases of all of their current inmates
and parolees. 48
2. The Government-Madison Avenue Connection
For a long time, private sector companies have relied upon
public records to obtain personal information about individuals
for marketing purposes. In the burgeoning Information Age,
marketing thrives upon personal information, giving rise to an
entire industry devoted to the collection of personal informa-
tion. I have discussed the history and current collection and use
of personal information by the private sector in more detail
elsewhere.49
Much of the information collected by the private sector
comes from public records and personal information held by the
government. For example, beginning in the nineteenth century,
advertisers began using census data as a marketing device. 50
In 1970, the United States began selling its census data on
magnetic tapes.51 Often at the behest of marketers, the Census
March 12, 2002) ; N.C. State Bureau of Investigation, North Carolina Sex Of-
fender & Public Protection Registry, at http//sbi.jus.state.nc.us/sor/ Main-
Text.htm (1998).
45. See Small, supra note 42, at 1456, 1463-64.
46. Edward Walsh, Kansas City Tunes In as New Program Aims at Sex
Trade: 'John TV,' WASH. POST, July 8, 1997, at A3.
47. Id.
48. D. Ian Hopper, Database, Protection, Or a Kind of Prison?: Web Regis-
tries of Inmates, Parolees Prompt a Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2000, at A31.
49. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1403-09.
50. ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER: How OUR PRIVATE LIVES
BECOME PUBLIC COMIODITIES 30-31 (1992).
51. See DICK SHAVER, THE NEXT STEP IN DATABASE MARKETING 29
(1996); see also LARSON, supra note 50, at 41.
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Bureau increasingly sought data about people's lifestyles. To
do this, the Census Bureau required a subset of households to
fill out a long questionnaire asking dozens of questions. 52
These questions included such information as how much rent
people pay, what products they own, their occupation, their
marital history, and their income.53 The connection between the
Census Bureau and marketers has been a very close one.
Presidents have frequently appointed former marketers to
serve as the head of the Census Bureau.54 In 1981, a group of
ten companies made a pact with the Census Bureau for it to
undertake a special tabulation of census data by zip code-with
the companies enjoying exclusive access to the results.55 The
questions asked by the census are often quite helpful to mar-
keters and the Census Bureau has been accused of being too in-
fluenced by the needs and wants of corporate America.5 6
For decades, many states have been selling their public re-
cords to the highest bidder.57 Colorado used to sell its motor
vehicle information for about $4.4 million a year.58 Florida of-
fered to sell copies of its motor vehicle information for $33 mil-
lion.59 New York earned $17 million in one year from such
sales.60 In 1994, the Federal Government, alarmed at this prac-
tice, passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, restricting
52. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER
270 (2d ed. 1996); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 127 (1971).
53. See MILLER, supra note 52, at 127. The 2000 Census long form asks
for information on sex, age, race, education, employment, income, value and
physical description of residence, vehicles owned, as well as other information.
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Long Form Questionnaire (Form D-2) available
at www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/do2p.pdf (approved for use by the public
through Dec. 31, 2000).
54. Since the 1970s, the Census Bureau has been run by a former director
of marketing at General Motors, an executive at a political polling firm, a re-
search manager for Sears, and a past president of the American Marketing
Association. LARSON, supra note 50, at 44.
55. Id. at 44-45.
56. Id. at 44-46.
57. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Governments Find Information Pays,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1998, at Al.
58. Robert Kowalski, Privacy Bills Up Next: Should Sale of Driver's Li-
cense Info Continue?, DENVER POST, May 5, 1997, at 1A.
59. Larry Rohter, Florida Weighs Fees for its Computer Data: Some See
Profits; Others, Too High a Price, N.Y. TIMES NATL, Mar. 31, 1994, at B9.
60. See Biskupic, supra note 12, at A8. Wisconsin receives $8 million an-
nually from the sale of motor vehicle data. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000,
1002 (7th Cir. 1998).
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such disclosures of information from motor vehicle records.61
Increasingly, there is a two-way information flow between
the private and public sectors. In other words, not only is the
government supplying information to the private sector, but the
private sector is assisting the government in generating infor-
mation about individuals. Currently, government agencies
such as the FBI and IRS are purchasing public record collec-
tions aggregated by private sector companies and combined
with other data gathered by the private companies. 62 A private
company called ChoicePoint, Inc. has amassed a database of
ten billion records and has contracts with at least thirty-five
federal agencies to share the data with them.63 In 2000, the
Justice Department signed an $8 million contract with Choice-
Point, and the IRS reached a deal with the company for be-
tween $8 and $12 million.64 ChoicePoint collects information
from public records from around the country and then combines
it with information from private detectives, the media, and
credit reporting firms.65 This data is indexed by people's Social
Security numbers.66 The Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (now the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) uses
ChoicePoint's data to help it identify fraudulent Medicare
claims by checking health care provider addresses against
ChoicePoint's list of "high-risk and fraudulent business ad-
dresses."67 ChoicePoint claims that it has records on almost
everybody with a credit card.68
ChoicePoint's information is not only used by government
agencies but also by private sector employers to screen new
hires or investigate existing employees. 69 The information in
ChoicePoint's collection is a mixture of fact and fiction.70 There
are a number of errors in the records.71 Richard Smith of the
Privacy Foundation obtained his report and discovered numer-
ous errors, including the false facts that he had been previously
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000).
62. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get
The Goods on You, It MayAsk ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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married and that his wife had a son three years before they
met.7 2 A ChoicePoint report also erroneously indicated that a
woman was a convicted drug dealer and shoplifter, resulting in
the termination of her employment.7 3 ChoicePoint also had a
hand in the 2000 Presidential Election problems in Florida.
ChoicePoint supplied Florida officials with a list of 8000 "ex-
felons" to eliminate from their voter lists. 74 However, many of
the 8000 were not guilty of felonies, only misdemeanors, and
were legally eligible to vote.75 Although the error was discov-
ered prior to the election and officials tried to place the indi-
viduals back on the voter rolls, the error might have led to
some eligible voters being turned away at the polls.7 6
3. The Impact of Technology
For a long time, public records have been accessible only in
the various localities in which they were kept. A person or en-
tity desiring to find out about the value of an individual's home
would have to travel to the town or county where the property
was located and search through the records at the local court-
house. Depending upon local practice, the seeker of a record
might be able to obtain a copy through the mail. Court records,
such as bankruptcy records, would typically be obtained by vis-
iting a courthouse or engaging in a lengthy correspondence
with the clerk's office.77 The seeker of a record could not obtain
records en masse; records could only be obtained for specific in-
dividuals.
This reality, however, is rapidly changing. As records are
increasingly computerized, entire record systems rather than
individual records can be easily searched, copied, and trans-
ferred. Private sector organizations sweep up millions of re-
cords from record systems throughout the country and consoli-
date those records into gigantic record systems. Many websites
now compile public records from across the country.78 There
72. See Richard Smith, My FBI File, at http'//www.privacyfoundation.org/
commentary/tipsheet.asp (May 11, 2001).
73. See Simpson, supra note 62, at Al.
74. See Gregory Palast, Florida's Flawed "Voter-Cleansing" Program, Sa-
lon.com, at http://www.salonmag.com/politics/feature2000/12/04/voterfile
index.html (Dec. 4,2000).
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 34, at 1012.
78. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational
Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1156-57 (1997).
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are more than 165 companies offering public record information
over the Internet.79 These companies have constructed gigantic
databases of public records that were once dispersed through-
out different agencies, offices, and courthouses, and with the
click of a mouse, millions of records can be scoured for details.80
The increasing digitization of documents and the use of
electronic filing will soon result in much greater accessibility to
court records online. A recent proposal to make court records
electronic and available over the Internet has garnered signifi-
cant attention. A majority of courts post only court rulings and
schedules on their websites. Only a handful of courts now post
complaints and other legal documents. 81 A few states have be-
gun to require electronic copies of records to be filed or to con-
vert existing records into electronic format. For example, in
New Jersey, bankruptcy records (including a debtor's bank-
ruptcy petition) are scanned into electronic format and can be
accessed through the Internet.82 Some companies are beginning
to make digital images of records available over the Internet. 83
Recently, the federal court system announced plans to de-
velop a system for placing court filings online. The existing
system, called PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Re-
cords), includes only basic docketing information such as the
names of the parties, attorneys, general type of action, and a
list of documents filed. The system under development, called
Case Management/Electronic Case Files ("CM/ECF"), is de-
signed to be in place by 2005.84 The system will make full case
files accessible via the Internet.85 Currently, nine courts use
79. See PUBLIC RECORDS ONLINE, supra note 17, at 8.
80. For example, KnowX.com states that it has amassed millions of public
records, which are updated regularly. See http://www.knowx.com (last visited
June 29, 2002). Search Systems contains over 6000 searchable public record
databases. See http-/vww.pac-info.com (last visited June 29, 2002). Lo-
cateme.com permits its users to search public records such as driver registra-
tions, voter registrations, and credit headers. See http'J/www.locateme.com
(last visited June 29, 2002).
81. See Joanna Glasner, Courts Face Privacy Conundrum, WIRED NEWS,
Feb. 26, 2001, at http'//www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41967,00.html.
82. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Dist. of N.J., Case Information, at
http://www.njb.uscourts.gov/caseinfo/ (last visited March 12, 2002).
83. See http://www.courthousedirect.com (last visited June 29, 2002).
84. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, at
http://privacy.uscourts.gov/Press.htm (Feb. 16,2001).
85. See Brian Krebs, Public Hearing Over Online Court Documents
Planned, NEWSBYTES, Feb. 20, 2001, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/
011162183.html.
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the CM/ECF system.86 Anybody is permitted to view, print,
and download any document filed in the system. The courts,
however, have not developed comprehensive policies to deal
with privacy concerns.87
Beyond greater accessibility, technology may also lead to
the retention of greater amounts of personal information in
public records. Under current practice, due to storage space
constraints, clerks' offices often do not maintain copies of exhib-
its and other documents related to trials. However, as court
documents such as pleadings and exhibits are filed in digital
format, they will become easier to store. Further, under cur-
rent practice, transcripts are typically produced only when a
case is appealed. New technology enables transcripts of court
proceedings to be made instantaneously without having to be
transcribed. The increased use of such technology could result
in the existence of more transcripts of trials, which can poten-
tially include personal information about many parties and
witnesses.
In sum, the increasing digitization of documents enables
more documents to be retained by eliminating storage con-
straints, increases the ability to access and copy documents,
and permits the transfer of documents en masse. Personal in-
formation in public records, once protected by the practical dif-
ficulties of gaining access to the records, is increasingly less ob-
scure.
B. THE REGULTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS
As it currently stands, public records law is a complicated
and diverse hodge-podge of various statutes, court practices,
and common law rights that vary from state to state and leave
much personal information unprotected. Our information regu-
latory infrastructure is disconnected, often outdated, and in-
adequate to meet the challenges of the new technologies of the
Information Age. This section provides a brief overview of the
law that governs public records.
1. The Common Law, Court Records, and Protective Orders
At common law, English courts rarely encountered cases
86. See Office of Judges Programs of the Admin. Office of the United
States Courts, Privacy and Access to Electronic Case Files in the Federal
Courts at 6, at http//www.uscourts.gov/privacyn.htm (Dec. 15, 1999).
87. Id.
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involving an individual seeking to gain access to government
documents. 88 In certain limited circumstances, English courts
recognized that the public could inspect certain government re-
cords.89 If an individual were denied the ability to inspect, she
could seek to enforce her right through mandamus; however,
there were severe restrictions on the ability to use mandamus
to obtain access to records. Individuals could not bring man-
damus on their own and had no right to access government
documents for their own personal purposes.90 There was a nar-
row exception to this rule, however, when the seeker of a record
needed to obtain it for use in litigation. Courts would generally
"not issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus to enforce a pri-
vate right of inspection, unless the purpose was to use it in
some pending or prospective suit."91 In contrast, access to court
records, as opposed to other public records, was broader. When
documents were introduced into evidence, individuals were
permitted access.92
Early U.S. courts followed the English practice. 93 In many
jurisdictions, an individual seeking to inspect non-court records
for the general public interest (to expose graft or corruption, or
to bring government activities into the sunlight), could not
bring suit in her own name; only the Attorney General could
bring an action on her behalf.94 However, if the person had a
"special interest" in examining the records (for example, to pro-
vide evidence in a legal proceeding), the individual could bring
a petition for mandamus on her own.95 As one court articulated
the rule in 1882,
The individual demanding access to, and inspection of public writings
must not only have an interest in the matters to which they relate, a
direct, tangible interest, but the inspection must be sought for some
specific and legitimate purpose.
96
88. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 25 (1953).
89. See, e.g., Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928). See
generally William Ollie Key, Jr., The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy
Judicial Records: In Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659 (1982).
90. Nowack, 219 N.W. at 750-51.
9L Id. at 751.
92. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 135; Key, supra note 89, at 666.
93. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 26.
94. Nowack, 219 N.W. at 751.
95. See id. at 751; CROSS, supra note 88, at 25-26; Comment, Public In-
spection of State and Municipal Documents: "Everybody, Practically Every-
thing, Anytime, Except.... .", 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1977).
96. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 305 (1882). Some jurisdictions, such
as Michigan and Rhode Island, recognized a broader right to access than the
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In several jurisdictions, the common law evolved to aban-
don the view that access to documents was limited only to liti-
gation purposes.97 The "interest" required for inspection was
expanded to include the interest in redressing public wrongs
and monitoring government functions.98 Under the modern
common law rule in many jurisdictions, a person can inspect
public records when the purpose is not improper and access is
not harmful to others.9 9 One of the most commonly mentioned
improper purposes for accessing public records was "to satisfy
idle curiosity or for the purpose of creating a public scandal." 1°°
Therefore, government officials could deny access to informa-
tion based on the person's reason for seeking the information. 10 1
Today, however, this discretion has been significantly reduced
by state and federal freedom of information laws.
In contrast to public records, the right to inspect court re-
cords was generally broader and was shaped by the supervisory
authority of the courts. 10 2 The courts had a long tradition of
permitting open access to court records, and access was rarely
limited based on the purposes for which the records were
sought. 0 3
English rule early on. See Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889); In
re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893).
97. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 26.
98. See id. at 27; Public Inspection, supra note 95, at 1108.
99. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 29. As one court explained, "We cannot
find any valid basis in our society for the imposition of the requirement of the
interest stated in the common-law rule as a prerequisite to the right to inspect
public records." City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519
S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
100. Voice of St. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d at 815; Husband, C. v. Wife, C.,
320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974) (characterizing the common law approach as
permitting access to judicial records if a person "has an interest therein for
some useful purpose and not for mere curiosity").
101. See, e.g., Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972); see
also Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in the
Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 543, 556 (1993) ("Most states depended on the discretion of agen-
cies, or on the common law, to provide public access to government records un-
til they were inspired by the federal FOIA to codify the concept of open gov-
ernment. The common law had varied among states, with most courts
requiring a person requesting a record to have a legitimate interest in, and a
useful purpose for, the requested record.").
102. See Key, supra note 89, at 668 ("Consistent with state court decisions,
federal courts historically allowed, absent sensitive circumstances, anyone to
inspect and copy judicial records for any purpose.").
103. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 135-36.
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In 1978, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 104 the
Supreme Court took notice of the right to inspect and copy both
public records and court records: "It is clear that the courts of
this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy pub-
lic records and documents, including judicial records and
documents." 10 5 The Nixon Court noted that "[iun contrast to the
English practice, American decisions generally do not condition
enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the docu-
ment or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit."10 6 The
Court explained that the right to access public records is justi-
fied by "the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the work-
ings of public agencies, and in a newspaper publisher's inten-
tion to publish information concerning the operation of
government." 10 7
The right of access to court records differs from the right to
access other public records. As the Nixon Court noted, the
common law right of access applies to court records; however,
the right is not absolute. 08 The Court observed that "[e]very
court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and
access has been denied where court files might have become a
vehicle for improper purposes." 109 The Court noted that public
access has been denied where records would have been used to
promote scandal by revealing embarrassing personal informa-
tion, to serve as "reservoirs of libelous statements for press con-
sumption," or to harm a litigant's business.110 The decision
over whether to permit access "is one best left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of
the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case."'
Thus, the common law protects privacy in the context of court
records by giving judges discretion over access to their records
and proceedings."12
104. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
105. Id. at 597.
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
108. Id.; see also United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir.
1997) (citing Nixon for the proposition that right of access is not absolute);
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d. 1044, 1047-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying a
balancing test to determine if public access is proper).
109. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 599.
112. Judicial discretion over access is, of course, constrained by the First
Amendment. See infra Part HI.A.
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In the federal court system, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c), judges have discretion "for good cause
shown" to issue protective orders to shield information from
disclosure where it might cause a party "annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."113 Rule
26(c) was part of the original version of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure adopted in 1938.114 The Federal Rules explic-
itly provided for protective orders because the Rules signifi-
cantly expanded pretrial discovery to encompass almost all in-
formation that could be of help in the preparation of the case. 115
This broad expansion created a new threat to privacy, as the
Rules did not differentiate between private and non-private in-
formation. To protect privacy, as well as other interests such
as trade secrets, Rule 26(c) was designed to limit the use of dis-
coverable information beyond the context of the litigation. 116
Most states have modeled their discovery provisions, including
protective orders, on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 117
Federal courts have held that there is a presumption in fa-
vor of access to court records. 118 When seeking a protective or-
der, the party seeking to maintain the confidentiality of a re-
cord has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of
access. 119 Courts balance a party's interest in privacy against
the public interest in disclosure. 120 If a court decides to deny
access, it "must set forth substantial reasons."121
Generally, documents disclosed to parties in discovery but
not filed in court are not subject to the common law right of ac-
cess. 122 According to the Supreme Court in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart,23 "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
114. Id.
115. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991).
116. Id.
117. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984).
118. See, e.g., United States v. EL-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3rd Cir. 1994); SEC
v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993); Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986).
119. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-10 (1st Cir.
1987).
120. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 413 (6th Cir. 1986).
122. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33.
123. Id.
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public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not
open to the public at common law, and, in general, they are
conducted in private as a matter of modern practice."124
Courts retain discretion to issue special orders to keep cer-
tain proceedings and information confidential. A court will
sometimes, under very limited circumstances, seal court pro-
ceedings such as trials. 125 Courts can seal court records if the
parties' desire for confidentiality outweighs the need for public
access. 126 A trial court can permit a plaintiff to proceed
anonymously with the use of a pseudonym. 127 Courts can also
permit anonymous juries when jurors might otherwise be
placed in danger. 28 These decisions, however, are within the
discretion of the trial court,129 and courts differ greatly in the
exercise of their discretion. For example, one court permitted a
woman raped at a train station who sued Amtrak to keep her
identity secret because of the potential embarrassment she
would suffer if the fact she was raped became widely dis-
closed.130 In contrast, another court held that a victim of sexual
assault could not sue her assailant for civil damages under a
pseudonym because "[flairness requires that she be prepared to
stand behind her charges publicly" and because she was "seek-
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. See, e.g., Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court
for E. Dist. of Cal., 183 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1999). The court must find that
those excluded have "a reasonable opportunity to state their objections" and
the court must make the following specific factual findings: that "(1) closure
serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a substantial probability that, in the
absence of closure, this compelling interest would be harmed; and (3) there are
no alternatives to closure that would adequately protect the compelling inter-
est." Id.
126. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994);
CAL. CT. R. 243.1(d)(1)-(5) (providing that a court may seal records if there is
an "overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record"
and the sealing is "narrowly tailored" and "[n]o less restrictive means exist to
achieve the overriding interest").
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v.
Bell Ati. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995); see also
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238-42 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d
320, 322-24 (11th Cir. 1992). The use of pseudonyms is rare and reserved only
for exceptional cases. "It is the exceptional case in which a plaintiff may pro-
ceed under a fictitious name." Id. at 323.
128. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, Court Access: The Pri-
vacy Paradox, at http'//www.rcfp.org/pp-pt3.html (last visited June 29, 2002).
129. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786.
130. See Doe v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CIU.A. 94-5064, 1997 WL
116979, at "1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1997).
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ing to vindicate primarily her own interests."131
In sum, under modern American common law, there is a
limited right to access public records so long as one's purpose is
not improper. For court records, the common law right to ac-
cess follows the supervisory authority of the courts, and judges
have significant discretion in granting or denying access. 132
2. Freedom of Information Laws
State legislatures gradually replaced or supplemented the
court-created right of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies with open records statutes, which generally mandated
open access. 33 These statutes are often entitled or referred to
as "freedom of information," "open access," "right to know," or
"sunshine" laws. States were initially slow in enacting statu-
tory public access rights; by 1940, only twelve states had open
records statutes. 134
In 1946, the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
contained a limited provision for disclosure of government re-
cords. 135 However, under § 3 of the APA, information could be
withheld if it involved "any function of the United States re-
quiring secrecy in the public interest" or was "required for good
cause to be held confidential." 136
In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), dramatically reforming public access to government re-
cords. According to the Senate Report for FOIA, the APA was
"full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate in-
formation to the public" and that information was often "with-
131. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. at 361; see also Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., 162
F.R.D. at 422 (D. Mass. 1995) (rejecting use of pseudonym for plaintiff alleging
a sexual assault by her supervisor at work and that she might have been in-
fected with lIV).
132. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811-15 (10th Cir.
1997).
133. See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records
Statutes, 28 URB. LAW. 65, 69-70 (1996); Jason Lawrence Cagle, Note, Protect-
ing Privacy on the Front Page: Why Restrictions on Commercial Use of Law
Enforcement Records Violate the First Amendment, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1421,
1422 n.2 (1999). While some states' FOIAs replaced the common law, courts in
some states have held that the state's FOIA operates as an additional right of
access to the common law. See id.
134. See Public Inspection, supra note 95, at 1107.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
136. Id., superceded by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2000). For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the APA, see Bunker et al.,
supra note 101, at 552-53.
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held only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregulari-
ties."137 When he signed the FOJA into law, President Lyndon
Johnson declared,
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A
democracy works best when the people have all the information that
the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull cur-
tains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without in-
jury to the public interest. 138
As Fred Cate observes, the FOIA serves three purposes:
"first and most important, ensure public access to the informa-
tion necessary to evaluate the conduct of government officials;
second, ensure public access to information concerning public
policy; and third, protect against secret laws, rules and deci-
sionmaking."139
Under FOIA, "any person" (including associations, organi-
zations, and foreign citizens) may request "records" maintained
by an executive agency. 140 FOIA does not apply to records kept
by Congress or the Judiciary.141 Requesters of records do not
need to state a reason for requesting records. 142
Today, all fifty states have open records statutes, a major-
ity of which are modeled after the FOIA. 143 Like the federal
FOIA, state FOIAs are justified by a strong commitment to
openness and transparency. 144
Many states, following FOIA, eliminated the common law
137. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965). The House Report likewise noted that
under § 3 of the APA, "[g]overnment agencies whose mistakes cannot bear
public scrutiny have found 'good cause' for secrecy." H.R. REP. No. 89-1497
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CA.N. 2418, 2423.
138. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 699 (1967), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3451.
139. Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to
Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L.
REV. 41, 65 (1994).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2000).
141. See id. § 552(f).
142. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989).
143. Jackson, supra note 26, at 111; Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 65-66.
144. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 (1997) (stating that "it is
vital that citizens have easy access to public records in order that the society
remain free and democratic"); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/1 (1) (West 1993)
(stating that the right to inspect public records "is necessary to enable the
people to fulfill their duties of discussing public issues fully and freely"); see
also IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2(1) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(a) (1999);
Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972).
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requirement of requesters establishing an interest in obtaining
the records. 45 Indeed, the federal FOIA and many state FOIAs
allow information to be obtained by anybody for any reason.146
Most state FOIAs contain a presumption in favor of disclo-
sure.
147
Open access laws never mandate absolute disclosure. They
contain exemptions, typically (although not always) including
an exemption to protect individual privacy. The federal FOIA
contains nine enumerated exemptions to disclosure, two of
which pertain to privacy. Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy."148 Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure "re-
cords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes...
[which] could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy. 49 If possible, private in-
formation can be deleted from records, and the redacted records
disclosed to the requester. 50
The federal FOIA does not require that a person be given
notice that his or her personal information is encompassed
within a FOIA request.151 Even if an individual finds out about
the request, she has no right under FOIA to prevent or second-
guess an agency's decision to disclose the records. FOIA does
not require that the government withhold information. 152 It is
145. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(b) (1999).
146. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771 (stating that the federal FOIA
provides the same access rights to the general public as it does to those assert-
ing a particular interest in a document); Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 78 (not-
ing that many state FOIAs eliminated the requirement of demonstrating need
or stating purpose); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2(1) (2001); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 132-6(b) (1999) ("No person... shall be required to disclose the pur-
pose or motive for the request."); State Employees Ass'n v. Dep't of Mgmt. and
Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 616 (Mich. 1987) (holding that Michigan's FOIA does
not require a person to justify her request for access); Mans, 290 A.2d at 867
(describing the elimination of common law discrimination based on the pur-
pose of the record seeker in New Hampshire's Right to Know Law).
147. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 66 & n.6 (conducting a comprehensive
survey of all state FOIAs as to the presumption of disclosure).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
149. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
150. See id. § 552(b).
151. Heather Harrison, Note, Protecting Personal Information from Unau-
thorized Government Disclosures, 22 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 775, 787 (1992).
152. Cate et al., supra note 139, at 49; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Par-
ticipation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United
States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 593 (1995).
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up to the government agency to assert and to litigate the indi-
vidual's privacy interest.1 53
State FOIA privacy exemptions come in myriad shapes and
sizes. Many state sunshine laws contain a privacy exemption
similar to that found in the FOIA, 154 applying when disclosure
would constitute a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of pri-
vacy."155 However, not all state FOIAs have a privacy exemp-
tion. Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act 156 does not contain a
privacy exemption; it prohibits only access to records "which
would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person's
reputation or personal security."157 As one court stated, "the
phrase 'personal security' does not mean 'personal privacy.'" 158
Ohio's Public Records Act does not contain any privacy exemp-
tion.15 9
The privacy exemptions in state FOIAs have often been
expanded or constricted by judicial interpretation. 160 In apply-
ing FOIA privacy exemptions, many states go along with the
federal FOIA approach and balance interests of privacy against
the interests of public access. 161 However, states have adopted
153. In contrast, companies seeking to protect trade secrets can initiate ac-
tions on their own to protect their information in what is known as a "reverse-
FOIA" lawsuit. See Harrison, supra note 151, at 783.
154. Jackson, supra note 26, at 114.
155. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-534(a)(2) (Lexis 2001) (applying a pri-
vacy exception where disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.243(1)(a) (1994) (stat-
ing that the privacy exception applies "where the public disclosure of the
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's
privacy").
156. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.1-66.4 (2000).
157. Id. § 66.1(2).
158. Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 329 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
159. See 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 2001)
(listing exceptions to disclosure); see also State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v.
Cleveland, 661 N.E.2d 187, 193-95 (Ohio 1996) (Resnick, J., concurring) (criti-
cizing the lack of a privacy exception in Ohio's Public Records Act).
160. For example, in In re Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Wash. 1986), the
court expanded the scope of the personal privacy exception under Washing-
ton's Public Disclosure Act to encompass anything that is connected to an in-
dividual or that reveals something "unique" about an individual. A number of
states have held that certain forms of public record information (such as
names and addresses) are not "private" because they do not involve intimate
or embarrassing details. See supra notes 155, 159 and accompanying text.
161. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 79. At least one state has rejected such
an approach, opting to apply the exception by determining solely whether such
information is private (but adopting a rather narrow conception of privacy).
See State Employees Ass'n v. Dep't of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 611-
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widely differing approaches often stemming from vastly differ-
ent judicial conceptions of privacy.
It is critical to note that the federal FOIA was passed be-
fore the rise of computer databases. In 1996, due to the devel-
opment of modem computer technology, Congress passed the
Electronic Freedom of Information Amendments (E-FOIA)162
which amended the FOIA to enable any person to access elec-
tronic documents (including e-mail messages) in the same way
he or she could access paper documents. 16 3 Agencies must
establish an index to the documents they possess and make the
index available on the Internet. 164 Further, agencies must es-
tablish "electronic reading rooms" where people can read docu-
ments online. 165 The electronic reading room must contain
documents that are likely to be requested multiple times.166 As
states computerize their records, these computer databases are
often encompassed within the broad definition of "public re-
cords" in many state FOIAs. 167 Some states explicitly include
computerized information in their definitions of public re-
cords. 168
3. Privacy Acts
The federal Privacy Act was borne out of fears of computer-
ized databases. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, social com-
mentators began to voice privacy concerns about computerized
databases. 169 People feared the eventual creation of a national
database using the Social Security number as the primary
identifier. 170 Throughout the mid-1960s and 1970s, Congress
13 (Mich. 1987).
162. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000)).
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 70.
168. Id. at 70, 75 & n.16.
169. See, e.g., MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 14 (1964);
MILLER, supra note 52; NOMOS XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W.
Chapman eds., 1971); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967);
WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 6, at 3-5; Kenneth L. Karst "The Files': Legal
Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 359-63 (1966). See generally Symposium, Com-
puters, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1968).
170. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 95 (1995).
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devoted a significant amount of attention to the problem. 71 In
1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) issued a profoundly influential report about computer
databases, condemning the trend toward making the Social Se-
curity number a universal identifier.1 72 The report noted a
growing public "distrust" with computer record-keeping sys-
tems173 and no "coherent or conceptually unified approach to
balancing the interests of society and the organizations that
compile and use records against the interests of individuals
who are the subjects of records."174 The report recommended
that a code of Fair Information Practices should be enacted:
* There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very
existence is secret.
e There must be a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used.
* There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for
other purposes without his consent.
* There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record
of identifiable information about him.
e Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating re-
cords of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the
data for their intended use and must take reasonable precautions to
prevent misuse of the data. 175
In 1974, after years of apprehension over computer data-
bases, Congress finally passed the Privacy Act. 176 The Privacy
Act, embodying the Fair Information Practices, gives individuals
the right to access and correct information about themselves
held by federal agencies and restricts federal agencies' collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information. According to the
Act, "No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a
system of records by any means of communication to any person,
or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or
with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the re-
cord pertains... ."177 Agencies can only maintain information
171. Id. at 71-74.
172. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REcORDs,
COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 108-35
(1973) [hereinafter HEW 1973 REPORT].
173. See id. at 28.
174. Id. at 35.
175. Id. at 41-42.
176. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 8.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000).
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about individuals that is "relevant and necessary" to accomplish
a particular purpose of the agency.178 When collecting personal
information, agencies must inform individuals about the pur-
poses for which the information is to be used, and the effects on
the individual for not providing any of the requested data.179
Agencies must ensure "security and confidentiality of re-
cords."180 Further, individuals can review their records upon re-
quest 181 and ask an agency to correct inaccurate data. 182 The
Privacy Act authorizes individuals to bring civil actions if agen-
cies do not correct an individual's record, fail to give an indi-
vidual access to her record, maintain a shoddy record that re-
sults in an adverse determination against an individual, or fail
to comply with any provision of the Privacy Act that results in
an adverse effect on an individual. 183
Additionally, the Privacy Act gives citizens certain rights
regarding the use of their Social Security numbers. Unlike the
rest of the Privacy Act, which applies only to federal agencies,
§ 7 of the Privacy Act makes it "unlawful for any Federal, State
or local government agency to deny any individual any right,
benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individ-
ual's refusal to disclose his social security account number."' 84
The Privacy Act, however, failed to bring the growing uses
of Social Security numbers under control. The use of the Social
Security number continued to escalate after the Privacy Act.185
The reason for this failure arose in part because the Privacy
Act's Social Security number provisions are limited only to the
public sector.186 As a result, Social Security numbers are fre-
quently collected by private sector entities, and it is currently
legal for these entities to sell or disclose Social Security num-
178. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
179. Id. § 552a(e)(3).
180. Id. § 552a(e)(10).
181. Id. § 552a(d)(1).
182. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
183. Id. § 552a(g)(1).
184. Id. § 552a note.
185. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: SOCIAL SEcuRITY: GOv'T AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE
SOC. SEC. NUMBER is WIDESPREAD 4, 7-12 (1999).
186. See id. at 78; see also Use and Misuse of Social Security Numbers:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, director of the Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center) (urging new legislation to protect wide-
spread uses of Social Security numbers).
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bers. Further, Congress frequently made exceptions to the Act
to expand the uses of SSNs.187
In addition to the problems with its regulation of Social Se-
curity numbers, the Privacy Act has other significant limita-
tions. The Privacy Act is limited only to the public sector.
188
The Act applies only to federal, not state and local agencies.
Further, the Act has been eroded by about a dozen excep-
tions. 189 For example, agencies can disclose information without
the consent of individuals to the Census Bureau, to law en-
forcement entities, to Congress, and to consumer reporting
agencies. 190 When FOIA requires that information be released,
the Privacy Act does not apply.191 Nor does the Privacy Act ap-
ply to court records. 192
The broadest exception is that information may be dis-
closed for any "routine use" if disclosure is "compatible" with
the purpose for which the agency collected the information. 193
The "routine use" exception has repeatedly been criticized as
being a gigantic loophole. 194 For example, in 1977, the federal
government began matching its computer employee records
with the records of people receiving federal benefits to detect
fraud.195 Records in different government benefit programs
were also compared. 196 Through this automated investigatory
187. PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY 50-51 (1998); Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got
Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use of
Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 569 (1998).
188. Although privacy advocates in Congress wanted the Act to extend to
the private sector, President Ford threatened to veto the law if it extended be-
yond public records. Sandra L. Macklin, Students' Rights in Indiana: Wrong-
ful Distribution of Student Records and Potential Remedies, 74 IND. L.J. 1321,
1325 (1999).
189. See STRUM, supra note 187, at 50-51.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12) (2000).
191. See id. § 552a(t)(2); Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, Merit Sys.
Prot. Bd., 819 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B), 552(f); see also United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d
992,1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Warth v. Dep't of Justice, 595 F.2d 521, 522-23 (9th
Cir. 1979).
193. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(3).
194. See Schwartz, supra note 152, at 585-87 (describing criticism of the
"routine use exemption" and advancing his own criticisms).
195. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 86. As Priscilla Regan has noted, sur-
prisingly, the Fourth Amendment implications of computer matchings have
not been litigated. See id. at 90.
196. See Robert Gelman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 198-99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds.,
116720021
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technique, the government investigated millions of people
quickly, efficiently, and secretly. This sharing of records be-
tween different government agencies, ordinarily a violation of
the Privacy Act, was justified under the "routine use" excep-
tion.197 In 1988, Congress finally passed a law regulating this
practice, 198 but the law has been strongly criticized as providing
scant substantive guidance and having little practical effect.199
As Robert Gellman correctly notes with regard to the "routine
use" exception, "[tihis vague formula has not created much of a
substantive barrier to external disclosure of personal informa-
tion."20
Although the Privacy Act requires an individual's permis-
sion before his or her records can be disclosed, redress for viola-
tions of the Act is virtually impossible to obtain. 201 The Privacy
Act provides individuals with a monetary remedy for disclo-
sures of personal information only if the disclosure was made
"willfully and intentionally."2 2 This restriction on recovery of
1997).
197. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 87.
198. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (2000)). The CMPPA requires agencies to formu-
late procedural agreements before exchanging computerized record systems
and establishes Data Integrity Boards within each agency to oversee match-
ing, requires agencies to perform a cost-benefit analysis of proposed matching
endeavors, and requires agencies to notify individuals of the termination of
benefits due to computer matching and permit them an opportunity to refute
the termination. Id.
199. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY
OF DECISIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES LrI=TL AFFECTED BY 1988 ACT 3
(1993) ("[Tlhe implementation of these new procedures does not appear to
have had major effects on the most important review process... ."); PAUL M.
SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 101 (1996);
Schwartz, supra note 152, at 588 (the CMPPA "creates no substantive guide-
lines to determine when matching is acceptable"); INFO. POL'Y COMM., NAT'L
INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT
10, at http://www.iitf.doc.gov/ipc/privacy.htm (1997).
200. Gellman, supra note 196, at 198.
201. See id. (pointing out that there is no administrative process in place to
challenge agencies' disclosures); Harrison, supra note 151, at 787 (noting that
'some persons who may have had their privacy violated by unauthorized
agency actions received no remedy for their injury"); Todd Robert Coles, Com-
ment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An Exami-
nation of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 975 n.118 (1991)
(stating that the "individual's ability to be made whole" has been "crippled"
under the Privacy Act).
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000).
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damages fails to redress the most common form of mistakes-
those due to carelessness. This leaves little incentive to bring
suit.20 3 For example, in Andrews v. Veterans Administration,204
the Veterans Administration released inadequately redacted
personnel records of nurses resulting in what the court called a
"substantial" violation of nurses' privacy. However, the agency
could not be sued under the Privacy Act because it acted negli-
gently, not willfully.205 Paul Schwartz aptly notes that "indi-
viduals who seek to enforce their rights under the Privacy Act
face numerous statutory hurdles, limited damages, and scant
chance to effect an agency's overall behavior. 20 6
Although several states have promulgated statutes protect-
ing privacy in certain narrow contexts, less than a third have
enacted a general privacy law akin to the Privacy Act.20 7 As
Paul Schwartz observes, most states lack "omnibus data protec-
tion laws" and have "scattered laws [that] provide only limited
protections for personal information in the public sector."20 8
4. Access and Use Restrictions
Confronted with increased information trade, some states
have attempted to restrict access to personal information in
public records as well as certain uses of personal information
obtained from public records. In the last decade, a number of
states have enacted access restrictions for some of their public
records, often excluding access for the commercial uses of solic-
iting business or marketing services or products. For example,
Georgia amended its public records law in 1991 making it
unlawful to access law enforcement or motor vehicle accident
records "for any commercial solicitation of such individuals or
relatives of such individuals."20 9 In 1992, Louisiana restricted
access to accident records for commercial solicitation pur-
poses.210 Kentucky, in response to "a public groundswell [that]
developed against the release of accident reports to attorneys
203. Coles, supra note 201, at 975 n. 118.
204. 838 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 425.
206. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 596.
207. See id. at 605. For a compilation of state privacy laws, see ROBERT
ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 3-66
(1997).
208. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 605.
209. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-9 (Harrison 1998).
210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:398(H) (West Supp. 2002).
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and chiropractors,"21' amended its public records law in 1994 to
restrict access for these and other commercial uses. 212 In 1996,
Florida restricted the access of driver information in traffic ci-
tations from those seeking it for commercial solicitation pur-
poses.213 Colorado prohibited access to criminal justice records
unless those seeking access signed a statement that such re-
cords would not be used "for the direct solicitation of business
for pecuniary gain."214 California recently restricted access to
arrest records by providing that the records "shall not be used
directly or indirectly to sell a product or service... and the re-
quester shall execute a declaration to that effect under penalty
of perjury."215 Almost half of the states prohib i the commercial
use of voter registration records. 216
The federal government also has certain access restrictions
for its public records. Pursuant to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA), reports of contributors to political commit-
tees are "available for public inspection.., except that any in-
formation copied from such reports ... may not be sold or used
by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for
commercial purposes. '2 17
In sum, although in certain contexts laws are beginning to
limit access to public records for some purposes, the vast major-
ity of public records remain virtually unrestricted in access.
211. Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 896 (6th Cir. 1999).
212. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.635 (Michie Supp. 2001).
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.650(11) (West 2001). The law explicitly noted
that it did not apply to media publication or "when used to inform a person of
the availability of driver safety training." Id.
214. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (2001).
215. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f(3) (West Supp. 2002).
216. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Government Finds Information Pays,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1998, at Al. For example, California provides that voter
registration lists may only be released to candidates, political committees, or
for "election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes." CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(2) (West Supp. 2002). Florida prohibits the use of lists
of registered voters for any use other than uses "related to elections, political
or governmental activities, voter registration, or law enforcement." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 98.095(2) (West Supp. 2002).
217. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2000). Although the FEC occasionally uses decoy
names to check to see if candidates are engaging in improper uses of the re-
cords, the FEC has not, according to critics, done much to investigate reports
of abuse. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 216, at Al.
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5. Restrictions on State Information Practices
In a rare instance, the federal government has directly
regulated the states' use of public records. In 1994, Congress
passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to curtail
the practice of many states of selling their motor vehicle re-
cords to marketers.218 Pursuant to DPPA, "A State department
of motor vehicles.., shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise
make available to any person or entity personal information
about any individual obtained by the department in connection
with a motor vehicle record .... " 219
Originally, DPPA provided that if an individual did not opt
out, then information could be used for any purpose. In 1999,
Congress amended DPPA, changing the opt-out provision to an
opt-in requirement, forcing states to require a driver's consent
before disclosing personal information to marketers.
In Reno v. Condon,220 the Supreme Court concluded that
DPPA was a proper exercise of Congress' authority to regulate
interstate commerce:
The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold
is used by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others en-
gaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized so-
licitations. The information is also used in the stream of interstate
commerce by variouspublic and private entities for matters related to
interstate motoring.22
1
The Court correctly recognized that information is an es-
sential aspect of commerce and that it is a matter appropriately
within Congress's power to regulate. Further, the Court con-
cluded that DPPA does not "require the states in their sover-
eign capacity to regulate their own citizens"22 2 because DPPA
"regulates the States as the owners of databases" and does not
require them to enact regulation or to assist in enforcing fed-
eral statutes concerning private individuals.223
Although DPPA is an important first step in bringing state
218. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2000)).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (2000) ( Under the amended DPPA, States may
not imply consent from a driver's failure to take advantage of a state-afforded
opportunity to block disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver's affirmative
consent to disclose ... personal information for use in surveys, marketing, so-
licitations, and other restricted purposes .. .
220. 528 U.S. 141, 144-45 (2000).
221. Id. at 148.
222. Id. at 151.
223. Id.
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public records systems under control, DPPA applies only to mo-
tor vehicle records and does not forbid the dissemination of all
the other public records states maintain.
6. Conclusion: The Regulatory Regime of Public Records
As illustrated above, states vary significantly in what in-
formation they make publicly available. Often such decisions
are made by agencies and bureaucrats or left to the discretion
of the courts. Decisions as to the scope of access-whether one
must obtain a record by physically going to a local agency office,
by engaging in correspondence by mail, or by simply download-
ing it from the Internet-are often made by local bureaucrats.
Frequently, it is up to the individual to take significant steps to
protect privacy, such as overcoming the presumption of access
to court records. In many instances, individuals are never even
given notice or an opportunity to assert a privacy interest when
records containing their personal information are disclosed.
Differing protection of personal information with no mini-
mum floor of protection presents significant problems in today's
age of increasing mobility and information flow. 224 There is no
federal law establishing a baseline for the regulation of public
records. Thus, personal information is regulated by a bewilder-
ing assortment of state statutory protections, which vary
widely from state to state. As Paul Schwartz notes, "[s]tate
data protection law in the United States is largely unchartered
territory."2 25 "Some data protection exists in every state," he
observes, "but no two states have adopted precisely the same
system of regulation."22 6
This chaotic state of affairs is troublesome in an Informa-
tion Age where information so fluidly passes throughout the
country and is being made more widely available by the Inter-
net and through private companies. The privacy protection
that currently exists for public records is largely designed for a
world of paper records and has been slow to adapt to an age
where information can be downloaded from the Internet in an
instant.
224. See Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination
of Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Pro-
tection, 41 EMORY L.J. 1185, 1205-06 (1992) (critiquing the lack of uniformity
in state public records laws).
225. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 604.
226. Id.
1172 [Vol.86:1137
ACCESS AND AGGREGATION
II. ACCESS AND AGGREGATION: RETHINKING PRIVACY
AND PUBLIC RECORDS
A. THE TENSION BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY
A 1998 episode of a television newsmagazine illustrates
one way that the tension between transparency and privacy
can arise.227 A man, imprisoned for murder, obtained under a
state FOIA the address of a former girlfriend.228 When she
learned that her ex-boyfriend obtained her address, the woman
became quite scared because her ex-boyfriend was prone to los-
ing his temper and held a grudge against her.229 She lived in
fear, knowing that someday he would be released and might
come after her.230 The prisoner, however, claimed that he was
the father of her child and needed the address because he
wanted to file a paternity suit.231 This story illustrates why it
is important for people to be able to obtain certain information
about others, yet also demonstrates the dangers and threat to
privacy caused by the ready availability of information.
There are at least four general functions of transparency:
(1) to shed sunshine on governmental activities and proceed-
ings; (2) to find out information about public officials and can-
didates for public office; (3) to facilitate certain social transac-
tions, such as selling property or initiating lawsuits; and (4) to
find out information about other individuals for a variety of
purposes. I will discuss each in turn.
First, and perhaps most importantly, transparency pro-
vides the public with knowledge about the government and an
understanding of how it functions.232 By promoting awareness
of the workings of government, transparency serves a "watch-
dog" function. Open access to government proceedings ensures
that they are conducted fairly.233 Public access exposes the
government to public scrutiny and enables a check on abuse
227. Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1998).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980)
(discussing the benefits to the public of conducting open criminal trials).
233. Id. at 569.
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and corruption.234 "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants," declared Justice Brandeis, "electric light the most effi-
cient policeman."2 35 As courts have observed, making arrest re-
cords public provides "valuable protection against secret arrests
and improper police tactics,2 36 and preserves "the integrity of
the law enforcement and judicial processes '2 37 by ensuring that
the public can prevent abuse of the government's power to ar-
rest individuals.238 Open access to public court records "allows
the citizenry to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby
insuring quality, honesty, and respect for our legal system."239
As James Madison observed, "A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Pro-
logue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives."24 0 According to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place un-
der the public eye not because the controversies of one citizen with
another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment
that those who administer justice should always act under the sense
of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to sat-
isfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is
performed.241
Access to court records permits people to examine the in-
formation considered by courts making decisions affecting the
public at large. Issues raised in a product liability case could
have significance for millions of others who use a product. In-
formation about how certain types of cases are resolved-such
as domestic abuse cases, medical malpractice cases, and oth-
234. Id.
235. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1932).
236. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606 (1968) (per cu-
riam) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (quotations omitted); see also Davis v. North
Carolina, 310 F.2d 904, 910 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (Haynsworth, J., dissent-
ing) (recycling on the police record to examine police tactics); Engrav v. Cra-
gun, 769 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Mont. 1989); Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. City
of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186 (Tex. App. 1975) (discussing the legitimate
interests for disclosure of police records).
237. United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985).
238. United States v. Ross, 259 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D.D.C. 1966).
239. In re Cont'l Ill. See. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984).
240. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
241. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
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ers-is important for assessing the competency of the judicial
system for resolving important social matters. Scholars and
the media need to look beyond a judicial decision or a jury ver-
dict to scrutinize records and evidence in a case. The ability to
identify jurors enables the media to question them about the
reasons for their verdict. Courts and commentators have
pointed out that the Watergate Scandal might never have been
uncovered if the original bail hearing had been closed to the
press because reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein
would not have been suspicious that expensive attorneys were
representing the burglars.242
The second function of transparency is to enable the scru-
tiny of public officials or candidates for public office. Informa-
tion about a politician's criminal history might be informative
to many voters. Information about a politician's property may
provide insight into the politician's wealth, a factor that might
shape the politician's values and public decisions. Some voters
may find a politician's divorce records and marital history illus-
trative of a politician's character. Other possibly informative
information about a politician could include that she was sued
many times or sued others many times; that she once declared
bankruptcy; that she never voted in any elections; that she was
formerly registered in another political party; that she owns
property in other states; and so on. Open access to public re-
cords enables voters to find out such information to make more
informed choices at the polls.
Third, transparency facilitates certain social transactions.
Access to public records is an essential function for the sale and
transfer of property, as it enables people to trace ownership
and title in land. Public record information is useful in locating
witnesses for judicial proceedings as well as locating heirs to
estates. Further, access to public records can allow individuals
and entities to track down individuals they want to sue and to
obtain the necessary information to serve them with process.
The fourth function of transparency is to enable people to
find out information about individuals for various other pur-
poses. Public records can help verify individual identity, inves-
tigate fraud, and locate lost friends and classmates. Public re-
cords enable law enforcement officials to locate criminals and
242. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 n.25 (5th Cir. 1983); G.
Michael Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Rich-
mond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 436 n.109
(1981).
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investigate crimes, and can assist in tracking down deadbeat
parents.243 Public records can permit people to investigate
babysitters or child care professionals. Employers can use pub-
lic record information to screen potential employees, such as
examining the past driving records of prospective truck drivers
or taxicab drivers. Criminal history information might be rele-
vant when hiring a worker in a child care facility or when hir-
ing a kindergarten teacher.2 "
Transparency, however, can come into tension with pri-
vacy. Can both of these important values be reconciled? Before
turning to this question, I must first address how the privacy
problem that public records contribute to should be understood.
Commentators have long struggled over defining what privacy
is and why it is important, especially in the context of informa-
tion collection and use.245 We must rethink certain longstand-
ing notions about privacy before we can reach an appropriate
balance between transparency and privacy.
B. CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY AND PUBLIC RECORDS
1. Access: The Public is Private
One of the longstanding conceptions of privacy is that it in-
volves secrecy and is lost once information is disclosed. I call
this the "secrecy paradigm." According to this paradigm, an in-
vasion of privacy consists of concealed information being un-
veiled or released in some way to others. Another central form
of invasion is being watched or listened to both surreptitiously
or in the open. The harms caused by these invasions of privacy
are self-censorship and reputational damage.246
This paradigm is so 'embedded in our privacy discourse
243. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 216.
244. I am not contending that all of these purposes are desirable uses of
public record data, especially since many of them constitute significant inva-
sions of an individual's privacy. However, many people view these purposes as
highly beneficial.
245. See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3
(1992) ("Exploring the concept of privacy resembles exploring an unknown
swamp."); MILLER, supra note 52, at 25; Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to
Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (stating that "nobody has a clear idea"
of what the right to privacy means); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) (stating that commentators have urged
looking past the rhetoric to truly understand privacy law).
246. Solove, supra note 7, at 1394-99.
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that privacy is often represented visually by a roving eye, an
open keyhole, or a person peeking through Venetian blinds.
Further, this paradigm explains why the Big Brother metaphor
has become so widely used for depicting privacy problems. 247
Much of privacy law has developed around this paradigm. For
example, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has routinely held that there is no expectation of privacy
whenever it is possible that something can be seen or heard
from a public vantage point, even if that perception is through
a sensory enhancement device. 248 Accordingly, the Court has
held that there is no expectation of privacy when the govern-
ment uses a sophisticated aerial camera to photograph objects
that cannot be seen by the naked eye,249 or when third parties
have access to information.250
Along with this paradigm, privacy is often understood as
an exclusive status or domain. Information is categorized as
either public or private. When information is private, it is hid-
den, and as long as it is kept secret, it remains private. On the
other hand, when information is public, it is in the public do-
main available for any use, and a person can no longer claim
that the information is private. Understood this way, informa-
tion has a particular status; it can either be in one domain or
another. The law often treats information in this black-and-
white manner; either it is wholly private or wholly public.
In the Information Age, this paradigm is outmoded, and
it could lead to the practical extinction of privacy. Unless we
live as hermits, there is no way to exist in modern society with-
out leaving information traces wherever we go. Life today is
247. Id. at 1396.
248. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
249. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). This term,
in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court held that
there are certain limits to how much technological enhancement of normal
perception is permissible when it concluded that thermal sensors violated the
Fourth Amendment.
250. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage because trash collec-
tors had access to it); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding
that no reasonable expectation of privacy in pen register of phone numbers di-
aled from a person's home telephone existed because the phone company could
record this information); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976)
(holding there is no reasonable expectation in financial records because banks
had access to them).
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fueled by information, and it is virtually impossible to live as
an Information Age ghost, leaving no trail or residue. Does this
mean that privacy is no longer possible? The answer to this
question is yes only if we adhere to the dichotomous conception
of privacy as a status, with information being in either a secret
private realm or an open public realm.
In order to protect privacy in the Information Age, we must
abandon the secrecy paradigm. Privacy involves an expectation
of a certain degree of accessibility of information. Under this
alternative view, privacy entails control over and limitations on
certain uses of information, even if the information is not con-
cealed. Privacy can be violated by altering levels of accessibil-
ity, by taking obscure facts and making them widely accessible.
Our expectation of limits on the degree of accessibility emerges
from the fact that information in public records has remained
relatively inaccessible for much of our history. When people
lived in small towns and everybody knew each other's business,
there was no large-scale system of record-keeping in place. To-
day, people have a lot more anonymity in the sense that they
often conduct many day-to-day activities among strangers. The
majority of Americans live in larger communities and fre-
quently move to different places throughout their lifetimes. 251
According to Janna Malamud Smith,
Control over private behavior, previously in the hands of the family,
the community or neighborhood, and the church, is now redistributed,
with more power granted on the one hand to individuals, and on the
other, at a greater distance, to the bureaucracies and institutions that
attempt to keep track of vast numbers of mobile people .... 252
We know that our lives will remain private not in the sense
that the information will be completely shielded from public ac-
cess, but in the sense that for the most part, it will be lost in a
sea of information about millions of people. Our personal in-
formation remains private because it is a needle in a haystack,
and usually nobody will take the time to try to find it. This
anonymity is rapidly disappearing as access to information is
increasing.
In limited contexts, some courts are beginning to abandon
the secrecy paradigm, although most of privacy law still clings
to it. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
251. About 75% of people live in cities or in suburbs to urban areas. JANNA
MALAMuD SMITH, PRIVATE MATrERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL LIFE 65
(1997).
252. Id.
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Committee for Freedom of the Press,253 the Court held that the
release of FBI "rap sheets" was an invasion of privacy within
the privacy exemption of FOTA_ The FBI rap sheets contained
the date of birth, physical description, and a history of arrests,
charges, and convictions on over twenty-four million people.254
FOIA exempts law enforcement records that "could reasonably
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."25 5 The reporters claimed that the events summarized
in the rap sheet were not private because they had previously
been publicly disclosed.256 The Court rejected this argument:
In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or
another divulged to another. Thus, the extent of the protection ac-
corded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of
dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the
passage of time rendered it private.... Recognition of this attribute
of a privacy interest supports the distinction, in terms of personal pri-
vacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained
in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole .... 257
As the Court further remarked, "there is a vast difference be-
tween the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police sta-
tions throughout the country and a computerized summary lo-
cated in a single clearinghouse of information."258
In cases involving the privacy torts,259 a few courts have
recognized a privacy interest in information exposed to the pub-
lic. For example, in Nader v. General Motors Corp.,260 Ralph
Nader, a prominent public figure and outspoken critic of con-
sumer safety, criticized the safety of General Motors' automo-
biles for many years.261 General Motors, attempting to dis-
credit Nader's reputation, interviewed his friends and
acquaintances to learn the private details of his life, kept him
253. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
254. Id. at 751-52.
255. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000).
256. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63.
257. Id. at 763-64 (citations omitted).
258. Id. at 764.
259. The privacy torts are often referred to collectively as "invasion of pri-
vacy" and consist of (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of pri-
vate facts; (3) false light or "publicity"; and (4) appropriation. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). The torts were inspired by the famous ar-
ticle by Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
260. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970).
261. Id. at 767.
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under surveillance, tapped his telephone and eavesdropped into
his conversations, and hired prostitutes to entrap him into an
illicit relationship.262 Of particular relevance, General Motors
hired a person to "shadow" Nader in public-to follow him
around and watch him engage in day-to-day activities.26 3 The
court held that generally observation in public did not consti-
tute an action for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.264 This
tort protects against the intentional intrusion into one's "solici-
tude or seclusion" or "his private affairs or concerns" that
"would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 2 65 Because
the tort requires an invasion of "seclusion," courts have typi-
cally rejected intrusion suits when plaintiffs have been in pub-
lic places.266 Nevertheless, in Nader, the court concluded that
"overzealous" watching such as "shadowing" could rise to a
level as to constitute a violation of privacy (even though all the
activities watched occurred in public).267
Likewise, in cases involving the tort of public disclosure of
private facts, a few courts have held that information once pub-
lic can be private under certain circumstances. The tort of pub-
lic disclosure permits a person to sue when one makes public "a
matter concerning the private life of another" in a way that "(a)
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not
of legitimate concern to the public."268 In Daily Times Democ-
rat v. Graham,269 a woman who went to a county fair had her
dress inadvertently blown up by air jets on the platform she
was standing on.270 A local newspaper photographer snapped a
photo of the woman at that moment, and it was published on
the front page of the newspaper.2 71 The woman sued for a vio-
lation of the public disclosure tort.2 7 2 The newspaper argued
that the picture was taken in public and therefore, she had no
262. Id.
263. Id. at 771.
264. Id.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
266. See, e.g., Muratore v. MIS Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D.
Me. 1987) (holding that no intrusion occurred when photographers harassed
and insulted the plaintiff in a public place).
267. Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 771.
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
269. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
270. Id. at 476.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 475.
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claim to privacy.273 The court, however, held that merely be-
cause a person is involuntarily placed in an embarrassing pose
in public does not eliminate privacy.274
In Melvin v. Reid,275 which is frequently referred to as "The
Red Kimono" case, a former prostitute who was once criminally
prosecuted for murder had left the prostitution business long
ago and led a normal life.276 A motion picture company pro-
duced the film "The Red Kimono," depicting her life story and
using her maiden name.277 She sued under the tort of public
disclosure.278 The court held that, although she could not claim
that the facts about her life were private because they were in
the public record, there was no need for the movie to use her
real name.2 79
Likewise, in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn,280 an article
in Reader's Digest Magazine about hijacking disclosed that the
plaintiff had hijacked a truck.28' The crime occurred eleven
years before the article; Briscoe had rehabilitated himself and
his new friends, family, and young daughter were not aware of
his previous life of crime.28 2 The court held that although the
article was newsworthy and the facts of Briscoe's crime could
be disclosed, Briscoe could sue for the use of his name, which
had no relevance to the article at all.283
Generally, however, most courts still adhere to the secrecy
paradigm and do not recognize a privacy interest when infor-
mation is exposed to the public. As a result, most courts have
rejected the Reid and Briscoe approach. 284 In Forsher v.
Bugliosi,28 5 the court noted that "California courts have re-
frained from extending the Briscoe rule to other fact situa-
273. Id. at 477-78.
274. Id. at 478.
275. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
276. Id. at 91.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 93.
280. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
281. Id. at 36.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 39-40.
284. Westphal v. Lakeland Register, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2262, 2263
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1977); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 431 (La. 1983); Monte-
sano v. Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Nev. 1983); Jenkins v.
Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
285. 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980).
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tions."286  The court considered Briscoe "an exception to the
more general rule that 'once a man has become a public figure,
or news, he remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public
mind to the end of his days.' 28 7 The Forsher decision was in
line with the Restatement for the tort of public disclosure:
"There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further
publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already pub-
lic. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about
the plaintiffs life which are matters of public record."288 Like-
wise for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the Restatement
provides that "there is no liability for the examination of a pub-
lic record concerning the plaintiff."28 9 Further, Briscoe seems
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,290 which held that when information is disclosed
in documents open to the public, the press cannot be punished
for publishing it.2 91
In a number of cases, courts applying the constitutional
right to information privacy have become mired in the secrecy
paradigm. Courts have refused to find a constitutional right to
information privacy for data that has previously been disclosed
or exist in a public record. In Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc.,292 a
court held that a husband and wife had no constitutional right
to information privacy in a police report disclosed to the press
containing the wife's allegations of spousal abuse.293 Although
her complaint to the police did not result in charges, "[tlhe po-
lice could have brought charges without her concurrence, at
which point all the information would have wound up on the
public record, where it would have been non-confidential."294 In
Cline v. Rogers,2 95 the court held that the constitutional right to
information privacy did not apply to the disclosure of police re-
cords because "one's criminal history is arguably not a private
'personal matter' at all, since arrest and conviction information
286. Id. at 726.
287. Id. (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 418
(1960)).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
289. Id. § 652B cmt. c.
290. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
291. Id. at 495.
292. 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991).
293. Id. at 207.
294. Id.
295. 87 F.3d 176 (6th Cir. 1996).
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are matters of public record. 2 96 In Walls v. City of Peters-
burg,297 the court upheld against a constitutional right to in-
formation privacy challenge a questionnaire asking public em-
ployees the criminal histories of their family members, their
complete marital history, including marriages, divorces, and
children, and any outstanding debts or judgments against
them.2 98 The court reasoned that there was no privacy interest
in this information because the data was already available in
public records.299
Courts have also adhered to the secrecy paradigm in chal-
lenges to Megan's Laws, which mandate the disclosure of per-
sonal information about convicted sex offenders after they have
completed their prison sentences. In Russell v. Gregoire,30° con-
victed sex offenders challenged Washington's sex offender law,
which provided for disclosure of their picture, name, age, date of
birth, crimes, and vicinity of residence to government agencies,
schools, and even to the media in certain instances.301 The
plaintiffs contended that Megan's Law was unconstitutional un-
der the constitutional right to information privacy, but the court
held that the information was not private because it was "al-
ready fully available to the public."302
In Paul P. v. Verniero,30 3 plaintiffs challenged New Jersey's
Megan's Law.3°4 Disclosure would be to law enforcement offi-
cials, schools, and community organizations for certain offenders
and disclosure to all members of the public for the most severe
offenders.30 5 The plaintiffs argued that the statutorily required
disclosure of their names, physical descriptions, and home ad-
296. Id. at 179; see also Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir.
1994) ("[An individual cannot expect to have a constitutionally protected pri-
vacy interest in matters of public record.").
297. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
298. Id. at 190-95. Additionally, the questionnaire asked whether they had
sexual relations with a person of the same sex. The court's conclusion that no
privacy interest existed for this information was based on a different rationale
than the other questions. The court concluded that under the "controlling"
Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), there
was no right to keep one's sexual orientation private. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193.
It is unclear how Bowers controls on this proposition.
299. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193-94.
300. 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
301. Id. at 1082.
302. Id. at 1094.
303. 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999).
304. Id. at 398.
305. Id. at 399.
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dresses violated the constitutional right to information pri-
vacy.306 The court explicitly rejected the logic of Reporter's
Committee, but recognized that the plaintiffs were entitled to
privacy protection with regard to their address information.307
In sum, courts are deeply divided about whether to adhere
to the secrecy paradigm. The Supreme Court clings to this
paradigm in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but has
abandoned it in its FOIA cases.3 08 Courts applying privacy
torts have occasionally departed from the paradigm, but gener-
ally follow it.309 Unless the secrecy paradigm is abandoned,
people will lose any ability to claim a privacy interest in the ex-
tensive personal information in public records.
2. Aggregation: The Digital Biography
Another longstanding notion of privacy is that it protects
against disclosure of particularly sensitive or intimate informa-
tion. According to this view, information that we should pro-
tect as private must be embarrassing or harmful to one's repu-
tation. However, the information in public records often
consists of fairly innocuous details-such as one's birth date,
address, height, weight, and so on. Eugene Volokh epitomizes
this view when he writes,
[M]any of the proposals to restrict communication of consumer trans-
actional data would apply far beyond a narrow core of highly private
information, and would cover all transactional information, such as
the car, house, food, or clothes one buys. I don't deny that many peo-
ple may find such speech vaguely ominous and would rather that it
not take place, and I acknowledge that some people get extremely up-
set about it.... If such relatively modest offense or annoyance is
enough to justify speech restrictions, then the compelling interest bar
has fallen quite low .... 310
A number of courts have rejected claims that certain in-
formation falls within state FOIA privacy exceptions because
306. Id. at 398.
307. Id. at 400-01, 405. But see Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995)
(following the conception from Reporters Committee when examining the con-
stitutionality of Megan's Law and noting that "a privacy interest is implicated
when the government assembles ... diverse pieces of information into a single
package and disseminates that package to the public, thereby ensuring that a
person cannot assume anonymity").
308. See supra notes 248-50, 253-58 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 260-308 and accompanying text.
310. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1117 (2000).
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the information does not pose immediate harm to one's reputa-
tion or security. One court reasoned that "[n]ames and ad-
dresses are not ordinarily personal, intimate, or embarrassing
pieces of information."311 Another court held that payroll re-
cords of the Philadelphia Police Department that contained
each employee's name, payroll number, gender, date of birth,
annual salary, and other personal data were subject to disclo-
sure because the records did not harm the officer's reputa-
tion.312 Information about teacher salaries, according to one
court, did not fall within the sunshine law privacy exception
because "[tlhe salaries of public employees and schoolteachers
are not 'intimate details... the disclosure of which might harm
the individual.' 313
If the release of certain information in public records does
not make one blush or reveal one's deepest secrets, then what
is the harm? I contend that the nature of the harm stems from
what I call the "aggregation problem." Viewed in isolation, each
piece of our day-to-day information is not all that telling;
viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait about our
personalities. The aggregation problem arises from the fact
that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily
amassed and combined. Even information in public records
that is superficial or incomplete can be quite useful in obtain-
ing more data about individuals. Information breeds informa-
tion. For example, although one's Social Security number does
not in and of itself reveal much about an individual, it provides
access to one's financial information, educational records, medi-
cal records, and a whole host of other information.
In a parable, The Circular Ruins, Jorge Luis Borges de-
scribes a person who aspires to dream a man in "painstaking
detail" so as to create an imaginary being so real that he can
move from the world of dreams into the world of reality.314 The
311. State Employees Ass'n v. Dep't of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606,
615 (Mich. 1987) (quoting Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comnm'n, 331 N.W.2d 184,
189 (Mich. 1982)).
312. Moak v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 336 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975).
313. Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 868 (N.H. 1972) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 11 (1966)) (discussing federal FOIA); see also Pottle v.
Sch. Comm. of Braintree, 482 N.E.2d 813, 816-17 (Mass. 1985) (holding that
payroll records containing names, salaries, overtime pay, and addresses of po-
licemen and school employees were not private within the meaning of Massa-
chusetts's FOIA privacy exception because the information was not intimate).
314. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Circular Ruins, in COLLECTED FICTIONs 96,
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person begins by imagining the man's heart and then adds de-
tails each night:
He dreamed the heart warm, active, secret-about the size of a
closed fist, a garret-colored thing inside the dimness of a human body
that was still faceless and sexless .... Each night he perceived it with
greater clarity, greater certainty .... On the fourteenth night, he
stroked the pulmonary artery with his forefinger, and then the entire
heart, inside and out.... Before the year was out he had reached the
skeleton, the eyelids.
3 15
Eventually, the person completes his goal and has assem-
bled enough details to create a dreamed being so realistic that
the being becomes real.316 At the end of the parable, the
dreamer realizes that he is but the dreamed person of an-
other.317
Borges's parable illustrates the power of aggregating de-
tails. In the Information Age, personal data is being combined
to create a "digital biography" about us. Information that ap-
pears innocuous can sometimes be the missing link, the critical
detail in one's digital biography, or the key necessary to unlock
other stores of personal information. There are several aspects
of this digital biography that raise alarm.
To the extent that the digital biography is accurate, our
lives are not only revealed and recorded, but also can be ana-
lyzed and investigated. Our digital biographies are being as-
sembled by companies like ChoicePoint, which are amassing
personal information in public records along with other infor-
mation. 318 Collectively, millions of biographies can be searched,
sorted, and analyzed in a matter of seconds. This enables auto-
mated investigations of individuals on a nationwide scale by
both the government and the private sector. Increasingly, pri-
vate sector entities are conducting investigations which can
have profound consequences on people's lives-such as their
employment and financial condition. Employers are resorting
to information brokers of public record information to assist in
screening job applicants and existing employees. For example,
the firm HireCheck serves over 4000 employers to conduct
background checks for new hires or current employees. 31 9 It
97 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998).
315. Id. at 98.
316. Id. at 99.
317. Id. at 100.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
319. Hire Check, Welcome to Hirecheck, at http'J/www.hirecheck.com/
flashintro/index.html (last viewed July 1, 2002).
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conducts a national search of outstanding warrants, a Social
Security number search to locate age, past and current employ-
ers, and former addresses, a driver record search, a search of
worker's compensation claims "to avoid habitual claimants or to
properly channel assignments," a check of civil lawsuit records,
as well as searches for many other types of information.320
These investigations occur without any external oversight, and
individuals often do not have an opportunity to challenge the
results.321
Although the digital biography contains a host of details
about a person, it captures a distorted persona, one who is con-
structed by a variety of external details. The digital biography
falls short of the perfection achieved by the dreamer in Borges's
parable. The problem, as Arthur Miller observed decades ago,
is that an "individual who is asked to provide a simple item of
information for what he believes to be a single purpose may
omit explanatory details that become crucial when his file is
surveyed for unrelated purposes."322 Further, although the
data in public records combined with the information market-
ers glean about us can be quite revealing, it still cannot pene-
trate into our thoughts and often only partially captures who
we are. W.H. Auden's 1940 poem, The Unknown Citizen, de-
picts the situation with eerie foresight:
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War until the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors, Inc.
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way.
320. Hire Check, Background Screening, at http://www.hirecheck.com/ Pro-
ductsAndServices/background Screening.html (last viewed July 1, 2002).
321. Id.
322. MILLER, supra note 52, at 34.
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Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modem Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war,
he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenicist says was the right number for a parent of
his generation,
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.
323
This poem aptly captures how day-to-day information both
reveals and distorts. Auden illustrates how our lives are cap-
tured to a significant degree by the information we leave be-
hind. Yet the information about our property, our professions,
our purchases, our finances, and our medical history does not
tell the whole story. We are more than the bits of data we give
off as we go about our lives. Our digital biography is revealing
of ourselves but in a rather standardized way. It consists of
bits of information pre-defined based on the judgment of the
government or some entity about what categories of informa-
tion are relevant or important. We are partially captured by
details such as our age, race, gender, net worth, property
owned, and so on, but only in a manner that standardizes us
into types or categories. Indeed, database marketers fre-
quently classify consumers into certain categories based on
stereotypes about their values, their lifestyle, and their pur-
chasing habits.324 Our digital biography is thus an unauthor-
ized biography, only partially true and very reductive. We
must all live with such unauthorized biographies about us, the
complete contents of which we often do not get to see. Although
certainly a more extensive dossier might be less reductive in
323. W.H. AUDEN, The Unknown Citizen, in COLLECTED POEMS 201 (Ed-
ward Mendelson ed., 1976). Used by permission of Random House, Inc.
Copyright 1940 and renewed 1968 by W.H. Auden.
324. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1424.
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capturing our personalities, it would have greater controlling
effects on an individual's life.
Our digital biographies are not only reductive but are often
inaccurate. In today's bureaucratized world, one of the growing
threats is that we will be subject to the inadvertence, careless-
ness, and mindlessness of bureaucracy. A scene from the movie
Brazil illustrates this problem by way of dark humor.325 The
movie opens with an exhausted bureaucrat swatting a fly,
which inconspicuously drops into a typewriter, causing a jam,
and resulting in a mistyped letter in a person's last name on a
form.326 The paper is a form authorizing the arrest and inter-
rogation of suspected rebels. In the next scene, the innocent
man whose name was wrongly typed on the form peacefully sits
with his family when suddenly scores of armor-clad police
storm into his tiny apartment and haul him away.327
These dangers are not merely the imaginary stuff of mov-
ies. The burgeoning use of databases of public record informa-
tion by the private sector in screening job applicants and inves-
tigating existing employees demonstrates how errors can
potentially destroy a person's career. Even before the ready ac-
cessibility of public records, significant problems emerged from
the use of such information. For example, in Paul v. Davis,328
the police distributed flyers with names and photographs to
various stores erroneously listing the plaintiff as an active
shoplifter.329 The plaintiff almost lost his job and was afraid to
enter stores. 330 In a more recent example involving computer-
ized information, a Maryland woman wrongly arrested for a
burglary was not cleared from the state's criminal databases.
331
Her name and Social Security number also migrated to a Bal-
timore County database relating to child protective services
cases.332 She was fired from her job as a substitute teacher,
and only after she could establish that the information was in
error was she rehired.333 When she later left that job to run a
325. BRAZIL (Universal Pictures 1985).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
329. Id. at 695.
330. Id. at 696-97.
331. Eugene L. Meyer, Md. Woman Caught in Wrong Net; Data Errors
Link Her To Probes, Cost 3 Jobs, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at C1.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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day care center for the United States' military, she was subject
to questioning about the erroneous arrest.3 34 Later on, when
employed at as a child care director at a YMCA, she was termi-
nated when her arrest record surfaced in a background clear-
ance check; she could not have the error expunged in sufficient
time, so the job was given to another person.335 Only after sev-
eral years was the error cleared from the public records.3 36 In
another example, as described earlier, the errors in the data
supplied by ChoicePoint to the Florida elections officials possi-
bly resulted in the loss of many people's right to vote.337 To the
extent that our digital biographies are increasingly relied upon
to make important decisions, the problems that errors can
cause will only escalate in frequency and magnitude.
Beyond these difficulties, our digital biographies greatly
increase our vulnerability to a variety of dangers. For example,
a website called the "Nuremberg Files" posted information
about doctors working in abortion clinics, including names,
photos, Social Security numbers, home addresses, descriptions
of their cars, and information about their families.338 The web-
site drew a black line through the names of murdered doctors
and shaded wounded doctors' names in gray.339 Fearing for
their lives and the lives of their families, the doctors sued to
shut the website down, but the Ninth Circuit held that the
website had a First Amendment right to publish the informa-
tion.340 The Nuremberg Files case illustrates the dangers cre-
ated from the increased access to public record information.
As public record information becomes more readily avail-
able, criminals can use it to gain access to a person's financial
accounts. For example, one industrious criminal gained access
to the financial accounts of a number of individuals on Forbes
Magazine's list of the 400 richest people in America such as
Oprah Winfrey and George Lucas.341 One of the most rapidly
escalating forms of crime is identity theft. 342 Identity theft oc-
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
338. See CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 42-43 (1999).
339. Id. at 43-44.
340. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d
1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001).
341. Jayson Blair & William K. Rashbaum, Man Broke Into Accounts of Ce-
lebrities, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at B3.
342. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age: Rise
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curs when an individual's personal information is stolen to
open new bank accounts, acquire credit cards, obtain loans, and
so on. In fact, the FBI stated that identity theft is the fastest-
growing form of white-collar criminal activity in the United
States. 343 Identity thieves frequently obtain personal informa-
tion necessary for their criminal activity through information
brokers, who sell reports about individuals based on public re-
cord data combined with other information. 3" Identity theft
creates severe hardship for victims, who must spend countless
hours-estimated at about 175 hours over two years-to mend
the damage to their credit.345
Public record information also proves useful for stalkers.
In 1989, a fan obsessed with actress Rebecca Shaeffer located
her home address with the help of a private investigator who
obtained it from California motor vehicles records.3 46 The fan
murdered her outside her home.347 This killing spurred Con-
gress to pass the DPPA, which restricts the states' ability to re-
lease motor vehicle records. 348 Ironically, however, the Act pro-
vided an exception permitting the disclosure of personal
information to private investigators without an individual's
consent.349
of Online Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. POST,
May 31, 2001, at Al. According to estimates by the Federal Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, there are half a million victims of identity theft
each year. Id. For a detailed discussion of identity theft, see Lynn M.
LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEY
L. REV. 89 (2001). According to LoPucki, the problem of identity theft is not
caused by the widespread accessibility of personal information but by the pri-
vate sector's use of Social Security numbers, addresses, and mothers' maiden
names as passwords. See id. at 108-14. Accordingly, LoPucki proposes a sys-
tem where people publicly register their identities and provide data for identi-
fication. See id. at 114-35. I agree with LoPucki that restrictions must be
placed on the way that the private sector maintains the security of personal
information. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1460. However, as described herein,
there are other problems associated with the widespread disclosure of personal
information. Even if LoPucki's solution combats the identity theft problem, it
can contribute to these other problems.
343. Jennifer S. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone Steals Your Name, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, § 3, at 8.
344. O'Harrow, supra note 342.
345. See Lee, supra note 343.
346. Lessley Anderson, Watching the I-Detectives, INDUS. STANDARD, Nov.
30, 1998, available at http'//www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,2581,
00.html.
347. See id.
348. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 102.
349. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8) (2000).
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At a more abstract level, the existence of digital biogra-
phies alters the nature of the society we live in. In 1971, in his
highly influential work on privacy, Arthur Miller warned of the
"possibility of constructing a sophisticated data center capable
of generating a comprehensive womb-to-tomb dossier on every
individual and transmitting it to a wide range of data users
over a national network."350 On a number of occasions, the fed-
eral government has flirted with the idea of creating a national
database of personal information. The Johnson Administration
contemplated creating a National Data Center that would com-
bine information collected by various federal agencies into one
large computer database, but the plan was scrapped after a
public outcry.351 Again, in the early 1970s, John E. Holt, an of-
ficial in the General Services Administration, proposed that all
of the federal government's computer systems be connected in a
network called FEDNET.352 Responding to a public outcry,
Vice President Gerald Ford stopped the plan.353
Although these proposals have been halted due to public
outcries, we have been inching toward a system of de facto na-
tional identification for some time and are precariously close to
having one.354 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
requires new employees to supply identification and proof of
United States citizenship before obtaining a new job.355 In a
recent effort to track down parents who fail to pay child sup-
port, the federal government has created a vast database con-
sisting of information about all people who obtain a new job
anywhere in the nation. The database contains their Social Se-
curity numbers, addresses, and wages.356 The ready availabil-
350. MILLER, supra note 52, at 39.
351. See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 338, at 44. In 1965, the Ruggles Commit-
tee issued a report urging that decentralized data among federal agencies be
consolidated. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 309 Due to a large public outcry,
the proposal was abandoned. See id. at 310-11; see also Note, Privacy and Ef-
ficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 HARV. L. REV.
400, 404 (1968).
352. SMITH, supra note 4, at 311.
353. Id.
354. See Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a Na-
tional Identification System, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 37, 39 (2002). See gen-
erally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
355. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 100
Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1365 (2000)).
356. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25 & 42 U.S.C. (2000)). See generally Robert 0'
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ity of one's Social Security number and the ability to combine it
with a host of other information about individuals will make
increasingly more possible a reality where typing an individ-
ual's name into a searchable database will pull up a "womb-to-
tomb" dossier.
Such a reality can pose significant dangers. "Identity sys-
tems and documents," observes Richard Sobel, "have a long his-
tory of uses and abuses for social control and discrimination."357
Slaves were required to carry identifying papers to travel; iden-
tification cards were used by the Nazis in locating Jews; and
the slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda was aided by a system of
identifiers. 358 In addition to facilitating the monitoring and
control of individuals, such a dossier may make a person a
"prisoner of his recorded past."359 Records of personal informa-
tion can easily be used by government leaders and officials for
improper monitoring of individuals. Indeed, such data can be
used for whatever task is at hand-a tool available to anyone in
power in government for use to further the current passion or
whim of the day. In 1942, the Census Bureau used its data
from the 1940 census to assist in the effort to intern Japanese-
Americans during World War 11.360 Currently, we do not know
the full consequences of living in a dossier society, but we are
rapidly moving toward becoming such a society without suffi-
cient foresight and preparation.
The problems and dangers illustrated above are not merely
the product of the actions of the government. Rather, these
troubles are caused by the way that both public and private
sector entities are using personal information. The issue con-
cerns more than isolated threats and harms, but is fundamen-
tally about the structure of our society. Not only are public re-
cords altering the power that the government can exercise over
people's lives, but they are also contributing to the growing
power of private sector entities. Elsewhere, I described the
problem of private sector collection and use of personal infor-
mation, and I argued that Franz Kafka's The Trial is an appro-
priate metaphor to conceptualize this problem.361 In The Trial,
Harrow, Jr., Uncle Sam Has All Your Numbers, WASH. POST, June 27,1999 at
Al.
357. Sobel, supra note 354, at 48.
358. See id. at 50-53.
359. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at 112.
360. See LARSON, supra note 50, at 53-54.
361. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1419.
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a bureaucratic court system has assembled a dossier of infor-
mation about the protagonist, Joseph K., and suddenly arrests
him one morning. K. is never informed of the reason for his ar-
rest, and he embarks on a frustrating quest to find out why he
has been arrested and the nature of the proceedings against
him. His information is in the hands of an entity that is ob-
scure, unaccountable, and uncontrolled.
Like The Trial, the current collection and use of personal
information are used to make decisions affecting an individual's
life, yet individuals often have no way to participate and no no-
tice about what is happening. Although people may be aware
that dossiers are being assembled about them, they have no
idea what information the dossiers contain or how the dossiers
are being used. For example, the HEW Report in 1973 aptly
observed
There was a time when information about an individual tended to be
elicited in face-to-face contacts involving personal trust and a certain
symmetry, or balance, between giver and receiver. Nowadays, an in-
dividual must increasingly give information about himself to large
and relatively faceless institutions, for handling and use by strang-
ers-unknown, unseen, and, all too frequently, unresponsive. Some-
times the individual does not even know that an organization main-
tains a record about him. Often he may not see it, much less contest
its accuracy, control its dissemination, or challenge its use by oth-
ers.
36 2
This reality creates a sense of unease, vulnerability, and
powerlessness-a deepening sense that one is at the mercy of
others, or, perhaps even more alarming, at the mercy of a bu-
reaucratic process that is arbitrary, irresponsible, opaque, and
indifferent to people's dignity and welfare.
The problem with information collection and use today is
not merely that individuals are no longer able to exercise con-
trol over their information; it is that their information is sub-
jected to a bureaucratic process that is itself out of control.36 3
Without this process being subject to regulation and control
and without individuals having rights to exercise some domin-
ion over their information, individuals will be routinely sub-
jected to the ills of bureaucracy.
Public records contribute to this privacy problem because
they are often a principal source of information for the private
sector in the construction of their databases. Marketers stock
their databases with public record information, and the uses to
362. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at 29.
363. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1440.
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which these databases are put are manifold and potentially
limitless. The personal information in public records is often
supplied involuntarily and typically for a purpose linked to the
reason why particular records are kept. The problem is that,
often without the individual's knowledge or consent, the infor-
mation is then used for a host of different purposes by both the
government and businesses.
Therefore, the privacy problem caused by public records
concerns the structure of information flow-the way that in-
formation circulates throughout our society. The problem is
not necessarily the disclosure of secrets or the injury of reputa-
tions, but is one created by increased access and aggregation of
data. Privacy is an issue that concerns what type of society we
want to construct for the future. Do we want to live in a
Kafkaesque world where dossiers about individuals circulate in
an elaborate underworld of public and private sector bureauc-
racies without the individual having notice, knowledge, or the
ability to monitor or control the ways the information is used?
C. TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY: RECONCILING THE TENSION
How can the tension between transparency and privacy be
reconciled? Must access to public records be sacrificed at the
altar of privacy? Or must privacy evaporate in order for gov-
ernment to be disinfected by sunlight?
It is my thesis that both transparency and privacy can be
balanced through limitations on the access and use of personal
information in public records. Of course, we must rethink what
information belongs in public records. But we must also regu-
late the uses of our digital biographies. Government is not do-
ing enough to protect against the uses of the information that it
routinely pumps into the public domain. If we abandon the no-
tion that privacy is an exclusive status, and recognize that in-
formation in public records can still remain private even if
there is limited access to it, then a workable compromise for the
tension between transparency and privacy emerges. We can
make information accessible for certain purposes only. When
government discloses information, it can limit how it discloses
that information by preventing it from being amassed by com-
panies for commercial purposes, to be sold to others, or to be
combined with other information and sold back to the govern-
ment.
Much of the personal information in public records is not
necessary to shed light on the way government carries out its
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functions. Rather, this information reveals more about the
people who are the subjects of the government's regulatory ma-
chinery. In the FOIA context, the Court has recognized that
FOIA should not be interpreted beyond its purpose-requiring
disclosure for information that "would not shed any light on the
conduct of any Government agency or official." 364 Nevertheless,
although the federal FOIA has served to shed light on govern-
ment activities and has supplied critical information for hun-
dreds of books and articles, 365 it has also been used as a tool for
commercial interests. The vast majority of FOIA requests are
made by businesses for commercial purposes.366 According to
Judge Patricia Wald, FOIA turns agencies into "information
brokers" rather than "a window for public assessment of how
government works."367 When weighing interests under the pri-
vacy exceptions to the federal FOIA, although courts cannot
consider the identity and purpose of the requester, they can
take into account the relationship of the requested document to
the purposes of FOIA.368 Unlike the federal FOIA, many states
routinely permit access by information brokers without looking
to the purposes of their sunshine laws or the public interest.
State FOIAs generally do not permit any discrimination
among requesters. In a number of cases, states wanting to re-
strict access to people requesting records for commercial use
had no statutory authority to do so. In Dunhill v. Director, Dis-
trict of Columbia Department of Transportation,369 a marketer
of personal information about individuals sought a listing on
computer tape of the names, addresses, birth dates, gender,
and expiration date of drivers permits of all people holding
364. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989); see also Schwartz, supra note 152, at 594.
365. Cate et al., supra note 139, at 65.
366. See id. at 50-51 (citing studies by the General Accounting Office,
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense).
367. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case
Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY
L.J. 649, 667 (1984).
368. See, e.g., United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178 (1991)
("The addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed any ad-
ditional light on the Government's conduct of its obligation."); Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (1989); see also Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d
315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[I]f disclosure of the requested information does not
serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the activities of their gov-
ernment, disclosure will not be warranted even though the public may none-
theless prefer, albeit for other reasons, that the information be released.").
369. 416 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1980).
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valid District of Columbia drivers permits.370 The court held
that the government had to release the information because the
statute did not authorize the government to look to the motives
of the request.371 In In re Crawford,372 a preparer of bank-
ruptcy petitions for debtors challenged the requirement that he
divulge his Social Security number on the petition, which
would then be made public. The court recognized that although
the person had a privacy right in his Social Security number
and that disclosure exposed him to dangers of fraud and iden-
tity theft, the interest in public access "is of special importance
in the bankruptcy arena, as unrestricted access to judicial re-
cords fosters confidence among creditors regarding the fairness
of the bankruptcy system."373 Thus, the court formalistically
invoked the principle of transparency, relying on the vague ar-
gument that total transparency fosters "confidence."
The danger with any principle is that it can drift to differ-
ent uses over time. J.M. Balkin explains this problem as "ideo-
logical drift." "Ideological drift in law means that legal ideas
and symbols will change their political valence as they are used
over and over again in new contexts."374 Laws fostering trans-
parency are justified as shedding light into the dark labyrinths
of government bureaucracy to expose its inner workings to pub-
lic scrutiny, and preventing the harrowing situation in Kafka's
The Trial-a bureaucracy that worked in clandestine and mys-
terious ways, completely unaccountable and unchecked. These
are certainly laudable goals, for they are essential to democracy
and to the people's ability to keep government under control.
However, sunshine laws are increasingly becoming a tool for
powerful corporations to collect information about individuals
to further their own commercial interests, not to shed light on
the government. A window to look in on the government is
transforming into a window for the government and allied pri-
vate sector entities to peer in on individuals. The data collected
about individuals is then subject to a bureaucratic process that
is often careless, uncontrolled, and clandestine. Because private
sector bureaucracies lack the transparency of those of govern-
ment, there is a greater potential for personal information to be
370. Id. at 246.
371. Id. at 247-48.
372. 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999).
373. Id. at 960.
374. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25
CONN. L. REV. 869, 871 (1993).
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abused. Paradoxically, a right of access designed to empower
individuals and protect them from the ills of bureaucracy can
lead to exactly the opposite result.
There are certainly instances where information about in-
dividuals can provide illumination on the way that the govern-
ment is functioning. The examination of accident reports may
reveal useful information about widespread problems with par-
ticular vehicles. Scrutiny of police records may indicate prob-
lems in police investigation and enforcement. Information
about the salaries of public school teachers and other public of-
ficials and employees may enable the public to assess whether
such officials and employees are being over- or under-
compensated. Disciplinary information about such employees
can allow taxpayers to assess the performance of those who are
earning their tax dollars. However, many of these purposes
can be achieved through evaluating aggregate statistical data
or by examining records with redacted personal identifying in-
formation.
The solution is not to eliminate all access to public records,
but to redact personal information where possible and to regu-
late specific uses of information. Real property information
must be made available for certain purposes, but it should not
be available for all purposes. It is necessary for a litigant to ob-
tain the address of a celebrity the litigant desires to sue in or-
der to serve process; however, to disclose the address to fans or
to publish it on the Internet is different.
Use restriction laws, such as those discussed above in Part
I.B, are a step in the right direction. These laws attempt to
navigate the tension between transparency and privacy by
permitting the use of public record information for certain pur-
poses but not all purposes. One of the longstanding Fair Infor-
mation Practices is purpose specification-that personal infor-
mation obtained for one purpose cannot be used for another
purpose without an individual's consent.375 Often the purposes
for the government collection of personal information vary
widely from the purposes for which they are used after they are
375. See HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at viii. The Fair Information
Practices were developed by the United Stated Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW) in 1973, and they consist of a number of principles for
the use and processing of personal information. The Fair Information Prac-
tices have proven to be highly influential in United States law as well as
throughout the world. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and
the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 44, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/1_STLE_index.htm.
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disclosed in public records. Governments collecting personal
information should limit such uncontrolled drift in use. Access
should be granted for uses furthering traditional functions of
transparency such as the watchdog function; access should be
denied for commercial solicitation uses because such uses do
not adequately serve the functions of transparency. Rather,
such uses make public records a cheap marketing tool, result-
ing in the further spread of personal information, which is often
resold among marketers.
Use restriction laws must go beyond basic restrictions on
access for commercial solicitation. The use of public records by
information brokers or other entities that aggregate personal
information and sell it to others is deeply problematic for the
reasons discussed earlier in this Part. Although information
brokers have brought a new level of accessibility to public re-
cords by combining them together in gigantic databases avail-
able online, they have also contributed greatly to the creation of
the digital biography. This type of aggregated public record in-
formation is often not used for the purposes of checking gov-
ernmental abuse or monitoring governmental activities.
Rather, it is used to investigate individuals. This investigation
is at the behest of other individuals, private detectives, employ-
ers, and law enforcement officials. Information brokers such as
ChoicePoint collect public record information and supplement it
with a host of other personal information, creating a convenient
investigation tool for government entities. The use of informa-
tion brokers by the government to investigate citizens runs di-
rectly counter to the spirit of freedom of information laws,
which were designed to empower individuals to monitor their
government, not vice versa.
Certain information should be restricted from public re-
cords completely. The Administrative Office proposal to sepa-
rate both paper and electronic documents into a public and pri-
vate file for civil cases and to restrict access to certain
documents in criminal proceedings such as presentence reports
is a step in the right direction.376 One example of information
that should be excluded from public records is a person's Social
Security number. Social Security numbers serve as a gateway
to highly sensitive information such as financial accounts,
school records, and a host of other data. Social Security num-
376. Judicial Conference, Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Ac-
cess to Electronic Case Files (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http'/
www.privacy.uscourts.gov/ RFC.htm.
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bers are very difficult to replace if they fall into the hands of an
identity thief. As a routine practice, Social Security numbers
should automatically be redacted from every document before
being disclosed publicly.
Jurors, parties to litigation, and witnesses should all be in-
formed of the extent to which their personal information could
become a public record and must be given an opportunity to
voice their privacy concerns and have information redacted.
The federal Privacy Act must be amended to provide more
meaningful protection. Its restrictions on the use of Social Se-
curity numbers must be strengthened to regulate and restrict
the use of Social Security numbers by the private sector. Fur-
ther, the Privacy Act should contain meaningful remedies for
violations and the "routine use" exception must be significantly
tightened.
Finally, more laws like the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
are necessary to nationalize public records law. We are becom-
ing an information society where information is no longer local-
ized. People frequently move from state to state and often do
not live where they were born or grew up. We need a strong
national information policy rather than the widely differing
state public record regimes. This is the most efficient and ef-
fective means to govern information flow in the United States.
A uniform baseline provides a good way to ensure privacy, for
all citizens to know about their privacy rights in public record
information, and for all users of information to know their re-
sponsibilities.
Therefore, a federal baseline should be established to gov-
ern public records in all states. This law should not preempt
states from adopting stricter protections of privacy, but it must
provide a meaningful floor of protection. Although each state
should adopt its own statute akin to the federal Privacy Act,
one option would be to extend the federal Privacy Act to the
states.
We may never be able to achieve complete secrecy of in-
formation in many situations and, in some situations, complete
secrecy would be undesirable. We can, however, limit accessi-
bility and use. The next Part examines to what extent the Con-
stitution might limit this approach.
III. PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE CONSTITUTION
In this Part, I examine whether the access and use restric-
tions I advocated in Part II can pass muster under the First
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. Understood
broadly, the First Amendment protects openness in information
flow. First, the Court and lower courts have held that the First
Amendment provides certain rights of access to at least some
government proceedings and records. Restrictions on the in-
formation available in public records might infringe upon this
right. Second, freedom of speech and the press prevent the
government from restricting the disclosure and dissemination
of information. A close analysis of the Court's decisions, how-
ever, reveals that access and use restrictions are constitutional.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment mandates that certain government proceed-
ings be open to the public. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,377 a plurality of the Court concluded that the First
Amendment provided the public with a right of access to crimi-
nal trials.378 Although seven Justices agreed that the First
Amendment provides a right of access to trials, no rationale
achieved a majority.
Two years later, the Court coalesced around an approach
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.379 There, a Massa-
chusetts law mandated that criminal trials be closed in all
cases where juvenile victims of sexual assault testified to pro-
tect their privacy.380 The Court struck down the law, reasoning
that a "major purpose" of the First Amendment is "to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs."381 The Court ar-
ticulated a two-prong test to determine whether the right to ac-
cess applies, first looking to whether the proceeding "histori-
cally has been open to the press and general public" and then
examining whether access "plays a particularly significant role
in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as
a whole."382 According to the Court, "public access to criminal
trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check
upon the judicial process-an essential component in our struc-
ture of self-government."383 The Court recognized that the right
377. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
378. Id. at 575-78.
379. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
380. Id. at 623.
381. Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
382. Id. at 605-06.
383. Id. at 606.
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to access criminal trials is not absolute. A state can deny ac-
cess to criminal proceedings if "the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."384 Although the state interest to protect
juvenile sexual assault victims was compelling, the Court con-
cluded that the mandatory rule requiring closure in all cases
was too broad.385
Shortly after Globe, the Court resolved that the right to ac-
cess extends beyond the immediate criminal trial to jury selec-
tion. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise 1),386 a trial for capital murder, the trial court se-
verely restricted public access to the questioning of prospective
jurors. Press-Enterprise moved for a release of the complete
transcript of the voir dire proceedings, but the trial court re-
fused because of concern for juror privacy since certain sensi-
tive matters were discussed.38 7 The Court held that there is a
public interest in ensuring that jurors are "fairly and openly se-
lected,"388 and concluded that the trial court too broadly closed
off access and failed to consider alternatives that were avail-
able to protect the jurors' privacy.389
The Court extended the right to access to pretrial proceed-
ings in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise
I).390 The Court reasoned that historical practice in the United
States had been "to conduct preliminary hearings in open
court"391 and that public access to preliminary hearings served
as an important "safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. 392
Lower courts determining the applicability of the First
Amendment right to access apply the two-prong test of Globe
Newspaper and the Press-Enterprise cases. Following the lead
of the Supreme Court, lower courts have proclaimed that the
right to access to criminal proceedings applies not only to trials,
pretrial proceedings, and jury selection, but also to pretrial
384. Id. at 607.
385. See id. at 607-08.
386. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
387. Id. at 504.
388. Id. at 509.
389. Id. at 512.
390. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
391. Id. at 10.
392. Id. at 12-13 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings, 393 as well
as bail hearings.394
Although the Court has never squarely addressed whether
the right of access applies beyond criminal proceedings, several
lower courts have extended it to civil cases. For example, in
Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,395 the court reasoned that
there was a long tradition for open civil trials and that "the
civil trial, like the criminal trial, plays a particularly significant
role in the fimctioning of the judicial process and the govern-
ment as a whole."396 Further, although no Supreme Court case
directly addresses whether the First Amendment requires ac-
cess to court documents, several courts "have concluded that
the logic of Press-Enterprise 11 extends to at least some catego-
ries of court documents and records."397 Not all courts agree,
however. 398
Courts have rarely applied the First Amendment right to
access beyond court records to other public records. The ra-
tionale for the right to access turns on the need for knowledge
about the government as an essential component of discourse
about the government. Although the Court's cases involve judi-
cial proceedings, the rationale can be logically extended beyond
such proceedings. Therefore, even if a state did not have a sun-
shine law or a common law right of access, the Constitution
might be interpreted to require a degree of openness.
Nevertheless, even under an expansive view, the right to
access does not apply to efforts to restrict the access to personal
information for particular uses. When public records illumi-
nate government functioning, access to government records is
generally consistent with the rationale for the First Amend-
ment right to access. However, the grand purposes behind the
393. See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982).
394. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983).
395. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
396. Id. at 1070 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
397. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
Littlejobn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Access means more
than the ability to attend open court proceedings; it encompasses the right of
the public to inspect and to copy judicial records."); Associated Press v. United
States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1984) ("There is no reason to
distinguish between pretrial proceedings and the documents filed in regard to
them.").
398. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994)
("[Tihere is no general First Amendment right in the public to access criminal
justice records.").
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right to access are simply not present in the context of much in-
formation gathering from public records today. As discussed in
Part II, public records are becoming a tool for powerful private
sector interests to use in furtherance of commercial gain.
These uses engender significant threats to individuals and to
the structure of our society, and they do not shed light on the
government.
In fact, the Constitution does not simply require open in-
formation flow; it also establishes certain responsibilities for
the way that the government uses the information it collects.
The Court has held that there are circumstances where the
government cannot force individuals to disclose personal infor-
mation absent a compelling government interest. In NAACP v.
Alabama,399 the Court struck down a state statute requiring
the NAACP to disclose a list of the names and addresses of its
members. The Court observed that there is a "vital relation-
ship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associa-
tions."400 Noting that revelation of membership in the NAACP
exposed members to potential economic reprisal and physical
violence, the Court declared that "[i]nviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable
to preservation of freedom of association."40 1 NAACP v. Ala-
bama suggests that the government cannot expose citizens to
the potential perils that public disclosure may bring. Reason-
ing in a similar fashion, in Greidinger v. Davis,402 the Fourth
Circuit held that Virginia's voter registration system, which re-
quired voters to provide their Social Security numbers (which
were then made publicly available), was unconstitutional be-
cause it forced people to risk public disclosure of their Social
Security numbers in order to vote.403 These cases can be read
to establish the important principle that the fear of disclosure
of personal information collected by the government is a recog-
nized injury, one that can interfere with the exercise of funda-
mental rights.
Further, under the constitutional right to privacy, the
Court has held that government has a duty to protect privacy
when it collects personal data. In 1977, the Court addressed
whether the right to privacy established in Griswold v. Con-
399. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
400. Id. at 462.
401. Id.
402. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993).
403. Id. at 1354.
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necticut,4°4 Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 5 and Roe v. Wade406 extended
to issues involving information as opposed to decisions about
one's body, sexual conduct, or health. In the landmark case
Whalen v. Roe,407 the Court held that the right to privacy en-
compassed the protection of personal information. At issue in
Whalen was a record-keeping system of people who obtained
prescriptions for certain addictive medications.4 8 The plain-
tiffs argued that the statute infringed upon their right to pri-
vacy.4°9 The Court proclaimed that the constitutionally pro-
tected "zone of privacy" extends to two distinct types of
interests: (1) decisional privacy, which the Court defined as
"independence in making certain kinds of important decisions";
and (2) information privacy, which the Court defined as the
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters."410 The Court concluded,
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumula-
tion of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files.... The right to collect and
use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a con-
comitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclo-
sures.... [I1n some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in
the Constitution .... 411
Whalen recognized that when the government collected
personal information, it took on a responsibility to keep it se-
cure and avoid disclosing it to others. 412
Since its creation in Whalen, the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy has begun to evolve in the courts. 413 The full
404. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
406. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
407. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
408. Such medications included opium, cocaine, methadone, and ampheta-
mines which were used in treating epilepsy, narcolepsy, migraine headaches,
and certain psychological disorders. See id. at 593 n.8.
409. Id. at 598.
410. Id. at 599-600.
411. Id. at 605.
412. The Court reiterated this notion of constitutional protection for infor-
mation privacy in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,
457 (1977), concluding that President Nixon had a constitutional privacy in-
terest in records of his private communications with his family. Id.
413. After Whalen and Nixon, the Court has done little to develop the right of
information privacy. As one court observed, the right "has been infrequently ex-
amined; as a result its contours remain less than clear." Davis v. Bucher, 853
F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988). The scope and existence of the constitutional
right to information privacy remains in dispute among lower courts. A majority
20021 1205
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
extent of the government's information handling obligations
awaits further development. It remains undetermined whether
these obligations extend to measures beyond non-disclosure,
such as the security of information, limited use, purpose speci-
fication, and other Fair Information Practices.
Nevertheless, taken together, the Court's jurisprudence in
the contexts of free association and the constitutional right to
information privacy suggests that the Constitution does not
merely mandate public access to information but also obligates
the government to refrain from disclosing personal information.
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS
The First Amendment more directly fosters information
flow about government activities by forbidding restrictions on
freedom of speech and the press. These freedoms extend be-
yond disclosure about government to almost all forms of dis-
course, including speech about private citizens.
Understanding how use and access restrictions on public
record information interact with the First Amendment requires
a difficult navigation between two lines of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. Under one line of cases-Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn Publishing Co.,414 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court In and For Oklahoma County,415 Smith v. Daily Mail,4 16
of the circuit courts has accepted the constitutional right to information privacy.
See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999); Walls v. City of Pe-
tersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Barry v. City of New York, 712
F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638
F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134
(5th Cir. 1978). One circuit court has expressed "grave doubts" as to the exis-
tence of the right, stopping short of confronting the issue of whether the right
existed. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 118
F.3d 786, 788, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit recognizes the right,
but only as a narrow corollary to the decisional privacy cases, pertaining to
personal information relating to one's health, family, children, and other in-
terests protected by the Court's substantive due process right to privacy deci-
sions. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981). To date, only a
handful of law review articles and notes have discussed the constitutional
right to information privacy in great depth. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington,
Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Con-
stitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1990);
Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 133 (1982); Gary R. Clouse, Comment, The Constitutional
Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 536 (1982).
414. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
415. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
1206 [Vol.86:1137
ACCESS AND AGGREGATION
and Florida Star v. B.J.F.417 -the Court has held that when the
government makes information publicly available in a public
record, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it. 4 18 In
Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing
Co.,419 however, the Court concluded that the government may
selectively grant access to public record information.420 In Se-
attle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,421 the Court stated that the gov-
ernment may condition the receipt of discovery information on
nondisclosure,422 a conclusion that is supported by the Court's
extensive unconstitutional condition jurisprudence. I will at-
tempt to navigate these choppy waters of Supreme Court free
speech jurisprudence to assess how the Court would (and
should) analyze the types of use and access restrictions I sug-
gested in Part II.
In a series of cases, the Court has struck down a number of
statutes prohibiting the disclosure of information gleaned from
public records. In Cox Broadcasting Corp.,423 the Court held
that a state could not impose civil liability based upon publica-
tion of a rape victim's name obtained from a court record.424 The
Court pronounced that "[olnce true information is disclosed in
public court documents open to public inspection, the press
cannot be sanctioned for publishing it." 425 In justifying the
rule, the Court concluded that not only does the ability to re-
port on the criminal justice system provide greater transpar-
ency in government, but that the fact that the information was
in a public record reduced the plaintiffs privacy interest.426
"[Tihe interests in privacy fade when the information involved
already appears on the public record."427 Punishing the press
for publishing public record information would "invite timidity
and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of
many items that would otherwise be published and that should
416. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
417. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
418. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 538.
419. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
420. Id. at 40-41.
421. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
422. Id. at 33-34.
423. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
424. Id. at 496-97.
425. Id. at 496.
426. Id. at 494-95.
427. Id.
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be made available to the public."4 2 8 If states wish to protect
privacy, they "must respond by means which avoid public
documentation or other exposure of private information."429
After Cox Broadcasting Corp., in Oklahoma Publishing
Co.,430 the Supreme Court held that a state court could not pro-
hibit the media from disclosing the name and photograph of an
eleven-year-old boy when the media had gleaned that informa-
tion by attending a juvenile proceeding. 431 In Smith432 the
Court struck down a statute prohibiting the publication of the
names of juvenile offenders: "[Ihf a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order."433
This line of cases culminated in Florida Star,434 in which a
newspaper published the name of a rape victim, which it ob-
tained in a publicly released police report. The report was in a
room with signs indicating that the names of rape victims were
not part of the public record and were not to be published. 435
The reporter even admitted that she knew she was not allowed
to report on the information. 436 The victim's fellow workers and
friends read the article; her mother received threatening phone
calls from a man who stated he would rape the woman again;
and these events caused her to change her phone number and
residence, seek police protection, and obtain mental health
counseling.437 Under a Florida law prohibiting the mass com-
munication of the names of rape victims, the paper was found
civilly liable.438 The Court, however, held that the Florida law
ran afoul of the First Amendment. "We hold only that where a
newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest or-
428. Id. at 496.
429. Id.
430. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
431. Id. at 311-12.
432. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
433. Id. at 103.
434. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
435. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
436. Id.
437. Id. at 528.
438. Id. at 526.
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der...."439
Taken together, these cases support the premise that once
the government makes information public, the government can-
not subsequently sanction its further disclosure. In Cox, how-
ever, the Court noted that it was not reaching "any constitu-
tional questions which might arise from a state policy not
allowing access by the public and press to various kinds of offi-
cial records."" 0
The Court addressed this issue in United Reporting Pub-
lishing Corp."1 when it examined the constitutionality of Cali-
fornia's access restriction law for arrestee information." 2 The
law required those seeking access to the information to execute
a declaration under penalty of peijury that address information
"shall not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or ser-
vice to any individual or group of individuals."" 3 Rejecting a
facial challenge that the law infringed upon commercial speech,
the Court reasoned that the statute was not "prohibiting a
speaker from conveying information that the speaker already
possesses" but was merely "a governmental denial of access to
information in its possession" under which it had no duty to
disclose.444 As long as the government is not under a duty to
provide access to information, it can selectively determine who
shall have access to it.4 5 The Court also held in Houchins v.
KQED Inc.46 that "[n]either the First Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to govern-
ment information or sources of information within the govern-
439. Id. at 541.
440. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496 n.26 (1975).
441. 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
442. Id. at 34.
443. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
444 United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. at 40.
445. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the Court held that a party obtain-
ing access to information via discovery could be restricted from disclosing that
information through a protective order. 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984). A newspaper
challenged a protective order on First Amendment grounds, but the Court up-
held the order, noting that the broad discovery rules permit parties to obtain
information "that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be dam-
aging to reputation and privacy." Id. at 35. Therefore, the Court held that
when a "protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by
Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not re-
strict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does
not offend the First Amendment." Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
446. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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ment's control."447
In addition to the cases discussed above, the Supreme
Court's "unconstitutional condition" jurisprudence lends fur-
ther support for the government's ability to condition access to
public records." 8 A series of cases establishes the limits of
what access conditions are permissible. According to the doc-
trine, originating during the Lochner era, "government may not
grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender
a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold
that benefit altogether."" 9 Kathleen Sullivan aptly character-
izes the doctrine as "riven with inconsistencies."450
In several cases decided during the 1950s and 1960s, the
Court invalidated several conditions requiring that recipients
of the government's largesse surrender constitutional rights.
In Speiser v. Randall,451 the Court held that war vetarans could
not be required to take a loyalty oath in order to receive a prop-
erty tax exemption because it "will have the effect of coercing
the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech."452 Sher-
bert v. Verner 53 struck down the denial of state unemployment
benefits to a person who refused to work on Saturday for reli-
gious reasons because it "forces her to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits." 454 Fur-
447. Id. at 15. In a series of cases, the Court has held that outside of the
First Amendment right of access, freedom of the press does not require that
the press be given any special rights to acquire information from the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609
(1978) ("The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to informa-
tion about a trial superior to that of the general public.); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (The Constitution does not ... require government to ac-
cord the press special access to information not shared by members of the pub-
lic generall) (citation omitted); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right
to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information."). Additionally, the Court held that the First Amendment cannot
foreclose a lawsuit by a confidential source to enforce a newspaper's promise of
confidentiality because the press "has no special immunity from the applica-
tion of general laws.... [and] no special privilege to invade the rights and lib-
erties of others." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-22 (1937)).
448. Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1418 (1989).
449. Id. at 1415.
450. Id. at 1416.
451. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
452. Id. at 519.
453. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
454. Id. at 404.
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thermore, in Shapiro v. Thompson,455 the Court held unconsti-
tutional the denial of welfare benefits to people who had re-
cently moved into a state because it chilled the right to inter-
state travel.456
Cases decided after the mid-1970s, however, are very in-
consistent. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash-
ington,457 the Internal Revenue Code provided a tax benefit to
veterans' lobbying groups but not other charities.458 The Court
applied minimal scrutiny because Congress was not required to
provide any tax advantage for lobbying.459 The government
was simply selecting "particular entities or persons for entitle-
ment."460
A year later in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Califor-
nia,461 the Court applied heightened scrutiny to strike down a
condition that federally-funded broadcasting stations refrain
from editorializing in order to receive funding from the gov-
ernment.462 Similarly, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland,463 the Court struck down a state sales tax that ex-
cluded certain types of magazines (religious, professional,
trade, and sports) but not others. 46
Returning to its permissive view of conditional funding, the
Court in Lyng v. International Union465 upheld a statute mak-
ing households ineligible for food stamps if any member of that
household was on strike: "[Elven where the Constitution pro-
hibits coercive governmental interference with specific individ-
ual rights, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as
may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that free-
dom." 466 Likewise, the Court reasoned in Maher v. Roe467 that
the government can selectively provide funds for normal child-
birth without having also to fund abortions.468
455. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
456. See id. at 634.
457. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
458. Id. at 542.
459. See id. at 549-50.
460. Id. at 549.
461. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
462. Id. at 402.
463. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
464. Id. at 233.
465. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
466. Id. at 369 (internal quotations omitted).
467. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
468. Id. at 479.
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Today, the leading case on the subject is Rust v. Sulli-
van,469 in which Congress prohibited workers in federally
funded family planning services from engaging in counseling
advocating abortion as a method of family planning.470 Reject-
ing a First Amendment challenge, the Court concluded that
[tihe Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative pro-
gram which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so do-
ing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other .... 471
As these cases indicate, the government retains significant
discretion in how it chooses to distribute its largesse. Public re-
cord information is part of this largesse, and the most recently
decided unconstitutional condition cases suggest that the gov-
ernment can impose certain conditions on how this information
is used before it grants access.
The Court's jurisprudence thus creates a distinction be-
tween pre-access conditions on obtaining information and post-
access restrictions on the use or disclosure of the information. If
the government is not obligated to provide access to certain in-
formation by the First Amendment, it can amend its sunshine
laws to establish pre-access conditions, restricting access for cer-
tain kinds of uses. Governments can make a public record avail-
able on the condition that certain information is not disclosed or
used in a certain manner. However, governments cannot estab-
lish post-access restrictions on the disclosure or use of informa-
tion that is publicly available.472 Once the information is made
available to the public, the Florida Star case prohibits a state
from restricting use.473
One could certainly argue that the Court's distinction be-
tween pre-access and post-access restrictions seems rather tenu-
ous. States can accomplish the same restrictions on disclosure of
public information that the Court struck down in Florida Star
with a simple redrafting of their statutes. In Florida Star, Flor-
469. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
470. Id. at 202-03.
471. Id. at 193.
472. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 523 U.S. 514 (2001).
473. 491 U.S. at 524 (1989); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (holding that a state could not criminalize a
newspaper's disclosure of leaked information about a judicial disciplinary pro-
ceeding).
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ida could have easily rewritten its law to make rape victims'
names available on the condition that the press promise they not
be disclosed. Those seeking access could be required to sign a
declaration that the information would not be disclosed or used
for certain purposes. Conditional access and use restrictions
thus appear to be an end-run around Florida Star. Can the
Court's distinction between pre- and post-access restrictions be
defended?
Certain language in Florida Star suggests that the case
turns on the government's unclean hands, as the Court empha-
sizes the government's failure "to police itself in disseminating
information."474 "[Wihere the government has made certain in-
formation publicly available," the Court observed, "it is highly
anomalous to sanction persons other than the source of its re-
lease."475 Acting hypocritically by disclosing information and
then punishing the press for the same offense, the state cannot
give the press the forbidden fruit and ask the press not to eat it.
Moreover, the Florida statute had no scienter requirement; it
imposed liability regardless of whether the rape victim's name
was already known throughout the community.476
This distinction between post- versus pre-access conditions
can be defended as a protection against the chilling effects
caused by uncertainty over the public record information that
can be disclosed. According to Cox Broadcasting Corp. and Flor-
ida Star, one should not have to act at her peril whenever she
discloses information obtained from a public record. By making
access conditional on a promise not to disclose or restricting ac-
cess in certain cases, however, there is a clear notice to the re-
cipient as to her obligations and responsibilities in handling that
information.
Without a distinction between post- and pre-access condi-
tions, the government would be forced into an all-or-nothing
tradeoff between transparency and privacy. The government
could make records public, allowing all uses of the personal in-
formation contained therein, or the government could simply
make records unavailable to the public for any purpose. How-
ever, by making access conditional on accepting certain respon-
sibilities when using data-such as using it for specific purposes,
not disclosing it to others, and so on, certain functions of trans-
474. 491 U.S. at 538.
475. Id. at 535.
476. Id. at 539.
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parency can be preserved at the same time privacy is protected.
Has the Court too quickly dispatched with the free speech
implications of conditional or limited access regulation? Do re-
strictions on commercial access, for example, constitute uncon-
stitutional content-based restrictions on free speech because
they single out specific messages and viewpoints-namely,
commercial ones? Prior to United Reporting Publishing, courts
were divided on the issue.477 Although commercial speech was
originally not considered to fall within the domain of the First
Amendment,478 in 1976, the Court recognized a limited First
Amendment protection for commercial speech.479 Typically, a
content-based restriction on regular speech is reviewed under
strict scrutiny, the most stringent form of constitutional scru-
tiny.480 Content-based restrictions on commercial speech, how-
ever, are reviewed under a form of intermediate scrutiny. Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of N.Y.48 1 sets forth the current test for analyzing restrictions
on commercial speech.482 Courts are to first examine whether
commercial speech is misleading or involves illegal activity; if
so, it is not protected.48 3 If, however, the speech is not illegal or
deceptive, then it is protected by intermediate scrutiny.484 The
477. Compare Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 1999), va-
cated and remanded by McClure v. Amelkin, 528 U.S. 1059 (striking down an
access restriction statute), and Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an access restriction statute implicated First Amendment), and
Babkes v. Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (striking down an
access restriction statute), with Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d
1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding Colorado access restriction to arrestee
records), Fed. Election Comm'n v. Int'l Funding Inst., Inc., 969 F.2d 1110,
1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding the Federal Election Campaign Actes mak-
ing political committee contributor lists available for public inspection with
the limitation that any information copied may not be sold or used for the pur-
pose of soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes because there was
no pre-existing right to have access to such lists), and DeSalvo v. State, 624
So. 2d 897, 901 (La. 1993) (upholding access restriction statute), and Walker v.
S. C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 348 (S.C. 1995) (hold-
ing that vehicle report access restriction "regulates only access to informa-
tion").
478. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
479. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
480. See Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 461 (1996).
481. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
482. Id. at 574.
483. Id. at 563-64.
484. Id. at 564.
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government interest must be substantial; the regulation must
directly advance the government interest; finally, the regula-
tion must be appropriately tailored to advance the government
interest (i.e., be no more extensive than necessary).485
The issue, then, is whether access restrictions are subject
to no First Amendment protection (except where barred by the
First Amendment right to access) or whether they implicate
speech and are subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson. Dissenting in United Reporting Publishing Corp.,
Justice Stevens argued that the California access and use re-
striction improperly singled out "a narrow category of persons
solely because they intend to use the information for a constitu-
tionally protected purpose."486
Stevens's argument is rejected by the unconstitutional
condition cases (especially Rust), which suggest that many ac-
cess restrictions will not implicate speech. Rust and some of its
predecessors have engendered significant criticism, and in my
opinion, rightly so. Although I believe that a number of the un-
constitutional conditions cases, including Rust, were wrongly
decided, many use and access restrictions on personal informa-
tion in public records will still pass constitutional muster with-
out the aid of these cases.
Kathleen Sullivan has made one of the most persuasive at-
tacks against the unconstitutional condition cases. As she ex-
plains, the Court's approach is to look for when conditions co-
erce individuals to surrender rights or whether such conditions
are enacted out of subterfuge and manipulation.4 87 This ap-
proach, Sullivan argues, is too narrow and crabbed, for uncon-
stitutional conditions "can alter the balance of power between
government and rightholders" and can "skew the distribution of
constitutional rights among rightholders because [the govern-
ment] necessarily discriminates facially between those who do
and those who do not comply with the condition."488 Accord-
ingly, Sullivan suggests a broader form of analysis for unconsti-
tutional conditions, one that "would subject to strict review any
government benefit condition whose primary purpose or effect
is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a
preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by gov-
485. Id. at 565.
486. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 45
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
487. See Sullivan, supra note 448, at 1413-21.
488. Id. at 1490.
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emnment."489
Rust certainly lends support for the theory that govern-
ment can make access to personal information in public records
conditional on non-disclosure or on particular uses. Addition-
ally, Rust supports selective access restrictions. Rust is a trou-
bling case in my opinion, but I contend that the free speech ar-
gument against public record access restrictions fails without
having to enlist the aid of cases like Rust. In Rust, the gov-
ernment made funding conditional on the expression of a par-
ticular viewpoint. This is troublesome, for it is a use of gov-
ernment power (albeit in the guise of a carrot rather than a
stick) to restrict certain views. In contrast, commercial access
restrictions are not being applied because of disagreement with
the message that commercial users wish to send. Nor do they
favor a particular speaker or specific ideas. Although particu-
lar categories of use (i.e., commercial) are being singled out,
avoiding viewpoint discrimination does not entail avoiding all
attempts to categorize or limit uses of information. Indeed, the
First Amendment constitutional regime depends upon catego-
rizing speech. Obscene speech and fighting words are not pro-
tected,490 false speech about public figures is protected in a lim-
ited way,4 91 and commercial speech is protected by intermediate
scrutiny. Although there is no bright line that distinguishes
when certain categories map onto particular viewpoints to such
a degree as to constitute discrimination based on viewpoint, the
category of commercial speech is broad enough to encompass a
multitude of viewpoints and is a category that forms part of the
architecture of the current constitutional regime.
Therefore, governments should be able to restrict access for
certain purposes or condition access on an enforceable promise
not to engage in certain uses of information. Although the
Court has opened a wide door to viewpoint discrimination in
Rust, a more appropriate approach is to curtail broad categories
of uses (i.e., commercial, information brokering, further disclo-
sure, and so on) rather than narrow categories, which often
single out particular viewpoints. , Thus, for example, govern-
ments should not restrict access to public records to those who
wish to use the information to advocate for certain causes
489. Id. at 1499-1500.
490. Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
491. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160-61 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 296 (1964).
1216 [Vol.86:1137
ACCESS AND AGGREGATION
rather than others. Nor could the government restrict access
based on the particular beliefs or ideas of the person or entities
seeking access to the information.
Even if Rust were wrongly decided, we are still not bound
to a rigid version of neutrality that forces the government into
a total access versus no access regime. The issue is whether
the government is singling out certain uses because of an intent
to curtail particular ideas it dislikes. A limitation on commer-
cial use is broad enough to encompass a diverse enough range
of viewpoints, and the government is merely limiting uses of in-
formation rather than the expression of particular ideas.492
CONCLUSION: REGULATING PUBLIC RECORDS
Public records are increasingly posing a serious threat to
privacy in the Information Age. To understand this threat, our
conceptions of privacy must be adapted to today's technological
realities. We must abandon the secrecy paradigm and recognize
that what is public can be private-not in the sense that it is
492. Even if the Central Hudson test were to apply, there is a good argu-
ment that commercial use restrictions would satisfy the test. It is true that
before United Reporting, a number of courts struck down access and use re-
strictions. However, they did so based on their adherence to the secrecy para-
digm. These courts often rejected the state's asserted privacy interest because
other uses of information were permitted. See, e.g., United Reporting Publ'g
Co. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd L. A.
Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Co., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) ("The fact that
journalists, academicians, curiosity seekers, and other noncommercial users
may peruse and report on arrestee records.., belies the LAPD's claim that
the statute is actually intended to protect the privacy interests of arrestees.");
Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1994) ("We note that any privacy
arguments the state asserts are disingenuous in light of the fact that the stat-
ute carves out an exception for the media to place any information they obtain
on the front page of any newspaper in Georgia.") (citation omitted); Babkes v.
Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D. Fla. 1996). According to this argument, if
states really want to protect privacy, they should also restrict the noncommer-
cial uses of information, such as publication of personal information by the
media. This argument is also raised by Justice Stevens in dissent in United
Reporting: "By allowing such widespread access to the information, the State
has eviscerated any rational basis for believing that the [statute] will truly
protect the privacy of these persons." United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 46 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). As I argued earlier, however, the fact that personal in-
formation is disclosed selectively does not extinguish one's privacy interest. It
is the particular uses of information that pose some of the greatest problems
for privacy. Even if the information is available for other purposes, there is an
interest in limiting access and uses, especially commercial access given the
escalating affront to privacy caused by private sector public record aggregation
and considering the fact that commercial users do not advance the purpose of
making such records public in the first place.
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secret, but in that uses and disclosures of information can be
limited. Privacy is about degrees of accessibility. The threat to
privacy is not in isolated pieces of information, but in increased
access and aggregation, the construction of digital biographies
and the uses to which they are put.
I advocate access and use restrictions on information as
well as a federal baseline of protection for all public records be-
yond the limited scope of DPPA. The key issue is whether such
a solution would be constitutional. As long as access and use
restrictions are based on a conditional grant of access, they will
pass constitutional muster. Further, the Constitution estab-
lishes an obligation to protect against disclosure and uses of in-
formation by the government. Today, government public record
systems are not meeting this constitutional obligation. States
must begin to rethink their public record regimes, and the fed-
eral government should step in to serve as the most efficient
mechanism to achieve this goal. It is time for the public re-
cords laws of this country to mature to meet the problems of
the Information Age.
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